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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
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PetitionerAppellant,
Supreme Court No. 34271
-VS-

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho.
HONORABLE RENAE J. HOFF, Presiding

Molly Husltey, State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703
Attorney for Appellant

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720
Attorney for Respondent
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DAVID L. YOUNG
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

OANVBN CQldRITtS CUWK
@ WAYKIB, BBPUTV

Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

SHANE MCKAY,
Defendant/Petitioner,
VS.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

1
)
)
)
)

is,

CASE NO. CV0700728

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION UNDER
I.C. s19-4906(~)

COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Respondent
State of Idaho, who pursuant to I.C. 919-4906(c) moves the Court for Summary Disposition on
the pleadings filed herein as there are no genuine issues of material fact and Respondent is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The basis of said request is as follows:
1.

Counsel filed appropriate proposed jury instructions and made the appropriate
legal arguments. &e, Exhibits "C", "D" and "E"attached hereto and incorporated
herein by this reference.

2.

The Courts jury instructions 201A, B, C, D, E, and F are adequate instructions on

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION UNDER I.C.§19-4906(c)
H:\MOTlON.ORD\rnckay motsumdiswpd

1

the law as it relates to the crime of Felony Vehicular Manslaughter. &,Exhibit

"B"attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
3.

The Courts instructions 201A is substantially the same as the pattern vehicular
manslaughter instruction in I.C.J.I. 709, and actually puts a HIGHER burden on
the State than the pattern instruction. Under I.C.J.I. 709, the State's burden is to
show that the defendant's conduct "was a significant cause contributing to the
death" of Ted Cox.. &,Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by
this reference. The Court's instruction required the State to prove that the
defendant's conduct was THE CAUSE of the death of Ted Cox. The Court's
instruction was, thus, of a benefit to Petitioner as it required a higher burden of
proof to be met before the jury could convict. Counsel's argument to the jury
focused on that higher burden, as well as upon the instruction on act and intent
(201F). Ineffective assistance of counsel can not be predicated upon conduct of
counsel that benefitted the Petitioner. As given, Instruction 201A contains an
express element as to "causation' which is greater than that required by the
statutory language of I.C. $18-4006(3)(b) and I.C.J.I. 709.

4.

The Court record and transcripts in CR032 1789 support a finding that trial
counsel was constitutionally adequate and competent and that Petitioner was
afforded a fair trial through counsel's assistance.

5.

Petitioner's citation to State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 108 P.3d 410 (Ct.App.
2005) is inappropriate. A charge of Felony Vehicular Manslaughter under I.C.
$ 18-4006(3)(b) does not include a negligence standard, but is premised upon

causing someone's death while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of
alcohol, i.e. "other culpable behavior". Furthermore, the Court and counsel were
both aware of I.C. $18-1 14 and LC.J.1. 305 on the "union or operation of act and
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION UNDER LC.$ 19-4906(c)
H:\MOTION.ORD\~IC
motsumdis.wpd
~~~

2

intent." &, Instructions of the Court, 201E, and Defendant's Proposed
Instructions. The jury was adequately instructed on the element of causation and
intent.
Oral argument is requested.

29-

DATED this -day of January, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for
Summary Disposition Under I.C.

9 19-4906(c) was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772,

y ,
Boise, Idaho 83'702, counsel for Petitioner, on or about this ~ ~ a n u a r2007.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITlON UNDER I.C.9 19-4906(c)

3
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ICJI 709 VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER
INSTRUCTION NO.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular
Manslaughter, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about [date]
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant [name], while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of [description of misdemeanor or
infractionl [driving while under the influence of alcohol];
[andl
[4. the unlawful act was committed with gross negligence;
and]
[41 [51. the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle in
such unlawful manner was a significant cause contributing to
the death of [name of decedent (s)I

.

You are further instructed that the unlawful act of [insert
description of misdemeanor or infractionl [driving while under
the influence of alcohol1 is committed when all of the following
are found to exist:
[Insert elements from statute or other instructions]
If the state has failed to prove any of the above, you must
find the defendant not guilty. If you unanimously find that the
state has proven each of the above, including each component of
the unlawful act of [insert description of misdemeanor or
infractionl [driving while under the influence of alcohol]
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
guilty of vehicular manslaughter.
Comment
I.C.

§

18-4006.

The committee chose to use the term "unlawful act," rather than
"crime," in paragraph number 3. An infraction could constitute
the offense that gives rise to the vehicular manslaughter
charge. Infractions are criminal offenses. State v. Bennion, 112
Idaho 32, 730 P.2d 952 (1986).
This first alternative paragraph number 4 should be used only
when the defendant is charged under IC § 18-4006(3) (a). See ICJI
342 for definition of "gross negligence."
[Revised July 20051
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CANY@I\l C G l J N T CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF M
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
)

STATE OF IDAHO

Plaintiff,
-vsSHANE MCKAY

Defendants.

1
1
)
)
)
)
)

1
1

CASE NO. CR-03-21789-C
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

INSTRUCTION NO.101
Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over with you
what will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted and what we will be
doing. At the end of the trial, I will give you more detailed guidance on how you are to
reach your decision.
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first. After the state's opening
statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the state has
presented its case.
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge against the
defendant. The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to do so. If the
defense does present evidence, the state may then present rebuttal evidence. This is
evidence offered to answer the defense's evidence.
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions on the
law. After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will each be given time
for closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will summarize the evidence to help
you understand how it relates to the law. Just as the opening statements are not evidence,
neither are the closing arguments. Alter the closing arguments, you will leave the
courtroom together to make your decision. During your deliberations, you will have with
you my instructions, the exhibits admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in
court.

INSTRUCTION NO. 102

This criminal case has been brought by the state of Idaho. I will sometimes refer to
the state as the prosecution. The state is represented at this trial by a deputy prosecuting
attorney, Virginia Bond and Gearld L. Woiff. The defendant, Shane Mckay, is
represented by Richard L. Harris. The defendant is charged by the state of Idaho with a
violation of law. The charge a g d the defendant is co~tainedin an Information. The
cIerk shall read the Information and state the defendant's plea.
The Information is simply a description of the charge; it is not evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO. 103
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The
presumption of innocence means two things.

F i the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that
burden throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his or her innocence,
nor does the defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all.
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A
reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt bared on reason
and common sense. It is the kind of doubt which would make an ordinary person hesitant to
act in the most important affairs of his or her own life. If after considering all the evidence
you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must find the defendant not
guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 104
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my instructions
regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either side may state
the law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding
others. The order in which the W c t i o n s are given has no significance as to their relative
importance. The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before
you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful
pertormance by you of these duties is vital to the administtation of justice.

In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial.
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received,
and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by
rules of law. At times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a
witness, or to a witness' answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked
to decide a particular rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed
to aid the Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I
sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may not answer the question
or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to guess what the answer might have
been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a
particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of your mind, and not refer to it or rely
on it in your later deliberations.
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which
should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will
excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any

problems. Your are not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from
time to time and help the hial rn more smoothly.
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct
evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to
consider all the evidence admitted in this trial.
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole
judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you
attach to it.
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with
you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday

affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you should apply

in your deliberations.

In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more
witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the
testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness
had to say.
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consi&r the
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You are
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.

LNSTRUCTION NO. 105
If during the trial I may say or do anything, which suggests to you that I am inclined
to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by
any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate,
any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of
mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard
it.

INSTRUCTION NO. 106
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject
must not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty
to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment.

INSTRUCTION NO. 107
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you
do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury
room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear
other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury
room.
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and
not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one
person the duty of taking notes for all of you.

INSTRUCTION NO. 108
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following
instructions at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during
the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night.
First, do not talk about this case either among yourseIves or with anyone eke during
the course of the trial. You should keep an open mind throughout the trial and not form or
express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision after you have
heard all the evidence, after you have heard my final instruction and after the final
arguments. You may discuss this case with the other members of the jury only after it is
submitted to you for your decision. All such discussion should take place in the jury room.
Second, do no let any person talk about this case in your presence. If anyone does

talk about it, tell them you are a juror on the case. If they wont stop talking, itport that to
the bailiff as soon as you are able to do so. You should not tell any of your fellow jurors
about what has happened.
Third. during this trial do not talk with any of the parties, their lawyers or any
witnesses. By this, I mean not only do not talk about the case, but do not talk at all, even to
pass the time of day. In no other way can all parties be assured o f the fairness they rn
entitied to expect from you asjurors.
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside
of the courtroom on your own. Do not go any place mentioned in the testimony without an
explicit order from me to do so.

You must not consult any books, dictionaries,

encyclopedias or any other source of information unless I specifically authorize you to do
SO.

Fifth, do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to radio or
television broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict solely on what is presented

in court and not upon any newspaper, radio, television or other account of what may have
happened.

INSTRUCTION NO. 201
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to
the law.
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some
and ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the
rules, you are bound to follow them. If anyone states a d e or law different from any I
tell you, it is my instruction that you must follow.

INSTRUCTION NO. 201A

In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, as charged in the
information, the state must prove each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. On or about the 5Ih day of October, 2003,
2. in the state of Idaho, Canyon County,

3. the defendant, Shane McKay, drove or was in actual .physical control of
4. a motor vehicle

5. upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the
public,
6. while under the influence of alcohol

while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by analysis of
defendant's blood,

7. and the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 201B
The phrase .'actual physical control." means being in the driver's position of the
motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving.

INSTRUCTION NO.201C
The term "highway" means the same as "street" and includes public roads, alleys,
bridges and adjacent sidewalks and rights-of-way.

INSTRUCTION NO. 201D
To prove that someone was under the influence of alcohol, it is not necessary that
any particular degree or state of intoxication be shown. The state need only show that the
defendant had consumed sufficient alcohol to affect the defendant's ability to drive the
motor vehicle.

INSTRUCTiON NO.201 E
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date, If

you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that
precise date.

INSTRUCTION NO. 201 F
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act
and intent.

INSTRUCTION NO. 201G
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose.
At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could not be

considered for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.
Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for
which it was admitted.

INSTRUCTION NO.201H
You have heard the testimony of Tina Hoover concerning a statement made by
Mike Warren before this trial. The believability of a witness may be challenged by
evidence that on some former occasion the witness made a statement that was not
consistent with the witness' testimony in this case. Evidence of this kind may be
considered by you only for the purpose of deciding whether you believe Mark Warren's
testimony. This evidence of an earlier statement has been admitted to help you decide if
you believe Mike Warren's testimony. You cannot use these earlier statements as
evidence in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2011
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to
testify. The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and
assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt From the fact
that the defendant did not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your
deliberations in any way.

INSTRUCTION NO.206
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those
facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts hrn all the evidence
presented in the case.
The evidence you are to consider consists oE

1.

sworn testimony of witnesses;

2.

exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and

3.

any facts to which the parties have stipulated.

Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence. including:
1.

arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What
they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is
included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts
as you remember them differ ffom the way the lawyers have stated them,
follow your memory;

2.

testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been
instructed to disregard;

3.

anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session.

INSTRUCTION
NO.

207

I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of
some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will
retire to the jury room for your deliberations.
The arguments and statements of the attomeys are not evidence. If you remember
the facts differently h m the way the attorneys have stated them, you should base your
decision on what you remember.
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are
important. It is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of
your opinion on the case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the
beginning, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your
position even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates,
but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and
declaration of the truth.
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before

making your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of
the evidence you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with the
law that relates to this case as contained in these instructions.
During your deliberations. you each have a right to re-examine your own views and
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest
discussion that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw
and heard during the trial and the law as given you in these instructions.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual

judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellowjwors.
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or
effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the
jury feels otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict.

INSTRUCTION NO. 208
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to
reach a verdict.

Whether some of the instructions apply will depend upon your

determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of
facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an
instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts.

INSTRUCTION NO. 209
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. They

are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter them or mark on
them in any way.
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific
instructions. There may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there
is, you should not concern yourselves about such gap.

MSTRUCTION NO. 21 1
Upon retiring to the jury room. select one of you as a presiding juror, who will
preside over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; that
the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every juror has

a chme to express himself or herself upon each question.
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court.
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise.

If, after considerjng all of the insiructions in their entirety, and after having N l y
discussed the evidence before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to communicate
with me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or anyone else how
the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you are instructed by me to do so.
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you

with these instructions.

DATED This

a

of

o&

,. 2003

RICHARD L. HARRIS
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1438
1023 Arthur

Caldwell, Idaho 83606
Phone: (208) 459-1588
Fax: (208) 459- 1300
ISB No. 1387
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff,

1
1
)
)

VS.

SHANE MCKAY,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1

CASE NO. CR-03-21789
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant by and through his attorney and submits
their proposed Jury Instructions and Respectfully request this Court to consider said
instructions in instructing the jury in this action.
DATED: This

day of October, 2004.

Exhibit

008168
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1

n

CERTFICATE OF SERVICE
I the undersigned do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

instrument was served on the following this

a

day of October, 2004.

DAVID L. YOUNG
Canyon County Prosecutor
Canyon County Courthouse
1 1 15 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

006)16;9
DEEh'DANT'S PROPOSED JURY WSTRUCTIONS - 2

United States Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Instruction No.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 5th day of October, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of driving while under the influence of
alcohol; and

4.

the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the
death of Theodore Cox.

You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving while under the
influence of alcohol is committed when all of the following are found to exist:
1.

That on or about October 5, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle;

4.

Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property
open to the public;

5.

While under the influence of alcohol and/or who has an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of his blood, urine
or breath.

If you Find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then
you must find the Defendant not guilty.

CbOO170

If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter.
ICJI 709

Instruction No.
Criminal negligence is such negligence as amounts to a wanton, flagrant or
reckless disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the safety and rights of
others.
ICJI 341

Instruction No.

In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or operation of act and
intent or criminal negligence.

I.C. 18-114

ICJI 305

Instruction No.
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption

places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, a Defendant begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against
him and the state must prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the Defendant
ever have to produce any evidence at all. Therefore, if after considering all of the
evidence and the instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not guilty.
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to

human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say
they feel an abiding conviction, to a morai certainty. of the truth of the charge.
ICJI 103

Instruction No.

You are instructed that if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, one of which points to the Defendant's guilt and the other to his
innocence, it is your duty as the jury to adopt that interpretation which points to the
Defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to hi guilt.

State v. Holiier, 1100 Idaho 129,594 P.2d 639 (1979)
State v, Hwnphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000)

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, on any highway any
vehicle which does not contain those parts or is not at all time equipped with the
lamps and other requirements in proper condition and adjustment, or which is
any manner in violation of the provisions of the Title 49, Chapter 9, Idaho
Code. "
A violation of the statute is negligem.

IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Every motorcycle and every motordriven cycle shall cany at least one
reflector either as part of the tail lamps or separately mounted on the vehicle at a
height of nat less than twenty (20) inches nor more than sixty (60) inches and
shall be of a size and characteristic and mounted so as to be visible at night from
all distances within three hundred fiftv (350) to one hundred (100) feet from the
beams of head~lam~s."[I.C. 49vehicle when directly in front of lawful u&

m

A violation of the statute is negligence.

IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Nothin herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle &e-asr
or older
of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to ex& one (1) inch
in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps othenvise comply with the
requirements of I.C.49-906."
A violation of the statute is negligence.
IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Every motor vehicle...shall be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp
mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required, shall emit a red light
plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear, and shall
be located at a height of not more than seventy-two (72) inches nor less than
twenty (20) inches. [I.C. 49-9061

A violation of the statute is negligence.
IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.
The term "negligencenrefers to a lack of that attention to the probable
consequence's of an act or omission which a prudent person ordinarily would apply to
the person's own affairs.
ICJI 341

Instruction No.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 5th day of October, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The Defendant. Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of driving while under the influence of
alcohol; and

4.

the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner c a d the
death of Theodore Cox.

You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving while under the
influence of alwhol is committed when all of the following are found to exist:
1.

That on or about October 5,2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle;

4.

Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property
open to the public;

5.

While under the influence of alcohol andlor who has an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of his blood, urine
or breath.

If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then
you must find the Defendant not guilty.

Q00181

If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter.

Instruction No.
Criminal negligence is such negligence as amounts to a wanton, flagrant or
reckless disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the safety and rights of
others.

Instruction No.
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or operation of act and

intent or criminal negligence.

Instruction No.

A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This presumption
p l a w upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, a Defendant begins the trial with a clean slate with no evidence against
him and the state must prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the Defendant
ever have to produce any evidence at all. Therefore. if after considering all of the
evidence and the instructions on the law, you have a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not guilty.
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt because everything relating to

human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say
they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.

Instruction No.

You are instructed that if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, one of which points to the Defendant's guilt and the other to his
innocence, it is your duty as the jury to adopt that interpretation which points to the
Defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt.

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, on any highway any
vehicle which does not contain those parts or is not at all time equipped with the
lamps and other requirements in proper condition and adjustment, or which is
any manner in violation of the provisions of the Title 49, Chapter 9, Idaho
Code. "
A violation of the statute is negligence.

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Every motorcycle and every motor-driven cycle shall carry at least one
reflector either as part of the tail lamps or separately mounted on the vehicle at a
height of not less than twenty (20) inches nor more than sixty (60) inches and
shall be of a size and characteristic and mounted so as to be visible at night from
all distances within three hundred fifty (350) to one hundred (100) feet from the
vehicle when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps." [LC.49-

9071
A violation of the statute is negligence.

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
'Nothing herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle thirty (30) years or
older of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to ex& one (1)
inch in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the
requirements of I.C.49-906."
A violation of the statute is negligence.

IDJI 2.22

Instruction No.

There was a certain statue in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Every motor vehicle...shall be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp
mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required, shall emit a red light
plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear, and shall
be located at a height of not more than seventy-two (72) inches nor less than
twenty (20) inches. V.C. 49-9061
A violationof the statute is negligence.

Instruction No.
The term "negligence"refers to a lack of that attention to the probable
consequences of an act or omission which a prudent person ordinarily would apply to
the person's own affairs.

,

Instruction No.

There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the display on any vehicle thirty (30) years o r
older of tail lamps containing a blue or purple insert lens not to exceed one (1)
inch in diameter, provided the tail lamp or lamps otherwise comply with the
requirements of I.C. 49-906. "
A violation of the statute is negligence.

Instruction No.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 5th day of October, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of driving at a speed greater than the posted
limit but without gross negligence; and

4.

the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the
death of Theodore Cox.

If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then

you must find the Defendant not guilty.
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter.

ICJI 709

Instruction No.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 5th day of October, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of Idaho;

3.

The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of driving at a speed greater than the posted
limit but without gross negligence; and

4.

the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the
death of Theodore Cox.

If you find from the evidence the State has failed to prove any of the above, then

you must find the Defendant not guilty.
If you unanimously find that the State has proven each of the above, beyond a

reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter.
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CALDWELL, IDAHO, OCTOBER 29,2004
(Counsel for respective
parties present, along with
the defendant.)

**********
THE COURT: All right. We're taking up
State vs. McKay outside the jury presence. Ihave been
meeting with the attorneys regarding proposed final
instructions, and Ihad caused to be delivered 201, a
verdict form, through instruction 211. Iwas also
provided with a proposed instruction drafted by the
defendant with regard to a lesser included of
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter.
I'll take up at this time first with the
State. Mr. Wolff, do you have objections or concerns
regarding the instructions or the verdict form?
MR. WOLFF: Judge, on the packet of
instructions that you have provided to us, no, Ido not
have any objections.
.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Harris.
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MR. HARRIS: Judge, if it please the
Court, Ihave submitted to the Court this morning after
the evidence has been presented an instruction on
vehicular manslaughter that is an instruction that
would activate subpart (c) of the vehicular
manslaughter statute.
And Ioffer the instructions on this
basis. The State has charged under part (b), which is
a felony. There is evidence under the record that
Shane McKay may well have operated this vehicle with a
BA less than .08. Because of the differential in the
time that the BA was taken and the time of the
accident, the jury could well find that that didn't
auulv.
,, ,
The jury could find, because of the
speed issues that were presented in evidence of this
s
case, that the unlawful act which triggers the
culpability could be the infraction of a speed greater
than the speed limit, which would then bring into
operation the misdemeanor section of the statute, so
the evidence would support the misdemeanor instruction.
And it seems to me that the manner in which this case
has been charged would also give the Court authority
for the giving of this instruction.
- We have talked brieflv about cause, and
the dilemma is what to do about cause. And Ihave
essentially taken the position that cause is something
that I'm not requesting a jury on this morning, but
it's certainly part of the dilemma.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Wolff.
MR. WOLFF: Your Honor, under
Mr. Harris's theory and under the statute as alleged,
there is either, A, no lesser included under the
vehicular manslaughter as we have charged under
subsection (b), or there are two lesser includeds, both
(a) and (c), felony vehicular manslaughter with gross
negligence under the interpretationof the facts that
Mr. Harris wants to give. Iwanted to make a record of
that.
He's talking about the speed and only
the soeed. He's not talkino about the crossina over of
the double yellow line at ttie railroad track to
oncoming traffic and running into the back of the
motorcyde proceeding down the roadway in his lane of
travel. That's gross negligence. I f s reckless to
cross the double yellow or to uoss over a centerline
at a railroad track, That's the statute. That's the
reckless diiing statute.
So there is more than enouoh evidence to
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support the lesser included of felony vehicular
manslaughter as much as there is to support a
misdemeanor manslaughter without gross negligence.
That's not how we have it charged. We
have this charged as subsection (b), under the
influence andlor, in the alternative, with a BAC over
-08. There's sufficient evidence in the record.
Mr. Harris wants to attack the BAC, but if you remember
Officer Woolery --excuse me Officer Marek's
testimony at the point when she made contact with Shane
McKay at the scene within 1415 minutes of the
accident, her opinion was that he was under the
influence of alcohol, so that fact is right there at
the scene.
Judge, we have charged under subsection
(b), We don't believe there is a lesser included of
misdemeanor manslaughter on the charge or the facts
that you have presented to you. Mr. Harris wants to
nitpick each and every fact here, and using his theory
and logic, every criminal case would have some type of
lesser included, and that's not the law. Lesser
includeds are those offenses that come from the main
charge that are factually supported by the charge and
for which there's legally sufficient basis for a
finding of guilt.

--

He can't have it both ways. I f he has a
lesser included, it's felony vehicular manslaughter
before they even reach the misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter. We don't believe that it's appropriate
for a lesser included.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
The Court has given a lot of thought to
whether the giving of a lesser included offense could
be given or the jury could be instructed to consider.
And in doing so, Iwent back and looked at the two
analyses for the consideration of lesser included.
A lesser included offense is one which
is necessarily committed in the commission of another
offense or, one, the essential elements of which are
charged in the Information as the manner or means by
which the offense is committed, and that's State versus
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111,1979, and ICR 31(c).
Having considered both ways to look at
this, Ialways have to go back to the Informationin
this case, which specifically charges that Shane McKay
did unlawfully, without malice, kill Ted Cox by
operating a motor vehicle in the commission of a
violation of Idaho Code Section 18-8004 under the
influence of alcohol in this case,
So in analyzing this, Ifurther go back
17
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to obviously the statute, vehicular manslaughter.
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice, and vehicular can be committed in three
different ways, (a), the commission of an unlawful act
not amounting to a felony with gross negligence, and
(c), the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to
a felony without gross negligence.
The State did not elect to charge under
(a) or (c). They chose instead to charge under (b),
the commission of a violation of Section 18-8004 or
8006. In this case, they elected the driving under the
influence under 8004.
Ialso looked specifically how Idaho
defined gross negligence. Essentially, gross
negligence is such negligence as amounts to wanton,
flagrant, or reckless disregard of the safety of
others.
And Mr. Harris has offered this
instruction. Ibelieve that Iam preduded from giving
it because this proposed misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter instruction can only be a lesser included
under (a) of the statute. In other words, it can only
be a lesser included because it would be less than
gross negligence. (A) is with gross negligence. (C)
is without gross negligence.

1
2
3
4
5
6

Iagree that in their cross-examination
of the State's experts that they may have raised --the
defense may have raised the issue and it was admitted
that Shane McKay's BAC could have been less than '08 ai
the time that it happened, so thars going to have to
be an argument that's made to the jury.
And as Isee it, we're left with the one
instruction and the one verdict form, so I'm going -the instruction will be preserved for appeal that was
proposed, and I'm ready to instruct the jury as I
proposed in the instructions.
Mr. Harris, did you have any other
concerns you wanted to raise about the verdict or the
instructions?
MR. HARRIS: Judge, just one other
comment. Iunderstand the CouKs ruling and will
accept that ruling for purposes of this morning. But I
probably -- and Ijust need to clarify m record on
this, and that is that, as Iunderstand at statute,
it talks in terms of an unlawful act that caused the
death.
The first one is an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony with gross negligence. The
second one is an unlawful act, meaning the DUI or being
under the influence. The third one is an unlawful act
19
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1 not amounting to a misdemeanor --yeah, a misdemeano
2 not a felony, but without gross negligence. And so as
3 Iread these three statutes together, it becomes an
4 included offense because we're talking about an
5 unlawful act in each event.
They've elected to charge under one
6
7 felony statute, and the unlawful act could be the
8 misdemeanor. They could find without gross negligence,
9 which would bring into play number three.
But I undwstand the Coufs ruling and
10
11 we will proceed from there, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. At this time,
12
13 then, we'll go ahead and have the jurors brought down
14 and we'll proceed with final instructions. We are in
15 recess.
16
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MS. BOND: Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen. First of all, let me start off by telling
you how much we greatly appreciate your time, your
attention, and your presence here. Without that, we
couldn't work this great system of justice that we all
are within, and we're proud of it. So on behalf of
mvself and Mr. Wolff and the prosecutor's office, we
think you.
Let me draw your attention to one thing
as Istart opening argument here. Notice, if you will,
that Ihave never used the term "accident" during this
presentationof the case, and there's a reason for
that, because this case was not an accident. This case
is a situation of willful conduct, This is choices
that were made by an individual, and these choices
resulted in the death of someone's loved one, and
-

--
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accountability is the factor,
In this particular case, the person who
made those choices is Shane McKay. He made the choice,
number one, to consume alcohol. He made the choice,
number two, to drive an automobile. And he made the
choice, number three, to drive that automobile in a
reckless and careless manner taking the life of Ted
cox.
This is no accident, This is a wreck.
This is a collision. This is a crash. This is what
we're here about today and what we've all spent the
last four days covering as evidence.
The State does have the burden of proof
as always, and the State has to prove certain things.
And to prove certain thinss, we have presented facts
through testimony here. "You must weigh and determine
which of those apply and basically decide what happened
in this case.
Let's go over those elements first.
This is kind of what Icall the building blocks of our
case, First of all, the State must prove that this
crime occurred on or about October 5th) 2003. Several
people have talked about that, police officers, Mike,
Monique.
That this crime occurred in Canyon
23
County, state of Idaho. Police officers again, I t
happened behind the Lowe's. Yes, that's in Canyon
County, state of Idaho.
Number three, that Shane McKay drove or
was in actual physical control. He admitted it,
admitted it to Tonna Woolery.
Motor vehicle, the Cadillac that is
sitting over at the shop that you saw.
And this happened upon a highway,
street, bridge, or property open to the public.
Several officers testified about, that that's a road
they travel every day. Ed Robertson, for one, told you
about that road and the contour of it specifically.
And under the influence of alcohol,
four, over .08.
These are the building blocks of this
particular case, and I've gone over some of the facts
that you've heard in court through the testimony that
support that, So once you realize, of course, that
this is not an accident, the way that we start with
looking at it is the first person that we heard
testify, Steve Wood.
Steve didn't know these folks that were
coming in front of him. He looked up. He was driving
that road with his kids in the pickup and saw two
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lights, He thought first it was a car. No, it's too
wide. Those are motorcycles, So he had his window
open, He looked out and admired the motorcycles going
by him, and he looked up and saw a car halfway in his
lane,
He was crossing the railroad tracks the
bikes had just crossed. He saw this car coming at a
high rate of speed and swerved back into the other lane
heading toward K-mart, and he thought he doesn't have
room, there's not enough room, Just as he thought
that, he heard the crash, saw the dirt fly. The
tremendous noise that accompanied this crash woke his
little girl up,
He pulled over to the side of the road
and called the police as Monique ran toward him
frantic. He didn't go back to the scene, but his
impression of this was very dear in that he saw the
motor vehicle coming, it was on the wrong side of the
road going back into the other lane, and heard the
crash.
And remember, Iasked him if he had any
background in edimating speed, and his estimate was 60
miles per hour. So when you look at the facts that
Steve purported, they line up with what also Mike and
Monioue testified to.

the car and somebodv runnina around outside the car.
He was tremendously! angry. 3omeone had just killed his
friend, his brother. He went over and he grabbed this
person and he hit him and he put him down on the ground
by his friend and stayed there holding him until the
police arrived.
And when they arrived, the first one
that came there was Tonna Wwlery, She was a
relativeiy new officer that came upon the scene. She
was the first one there, She went over to where Shane
McKay was, and in her conversation with him, she
noticed a few factors.
This is State's 25. She smelled the
odor of an alcoholic beverage, She saw bloodshot eyes.
She saw some behavior that concerned, and his speech
was slurred, the things he was saying, so she made a
decision that he was perhaps under the influence of
alcohol and asked him if he'd been drinking. He
admitted it. He'd been drinking. So when she looked
at the scene and saw that there wasa deceased there,
the decision was to take him to the hospital where
Stephanie Brannan drew blood and Tonna Woolery took
custody of it and that blood went to the lab.
Dave Laycock analyzed it, and Dave
Laycock testified that the blood alcohol content was a
-7

Mike and Monique were there. They were
on the motorbike next to Mr, Cox situated closest to
the centerline of the road. Mike was also driving a
Harley-Davidson and Monique was on the back, and her
job was to check all the taillights and all the
equipment on the bikes. They had gone to Denny's to
get the ranch dressing, had gone by the sugar beet
factory, had come over the overpass to the highway and
was headed towards Shari's to eat,
They reported, both of them, that this
is a hard tail motorcycle. It's got no shocks, so you
have to go slow over bumpy areas like railroad tracks,
so they slowed down. As they slowed down, they went
over the railroad tracks and they both looked over at
Ted, and he was laughing, he was smiling, making some
gesture. Suddenly, he was gone. He was gone forever.
They felt this great rush of wind, and Ted was gone.
There was parts of metal, There was
dirt flying in their faces. They never saw it coming.
They never saw it coming, which might be a clue to
interpreting what Ed Robertson testified about.
They pulled the bike over. I t came to a
stop. Mike ran over and found his brother, who he
refers to as his brother, dead, obviously dead. He
covered him with his leathers and looked over and saw

.15, which is almost twice the legal limit. Impairment
at that articular level would match up with the
driving ehavior in this case, according to Ed
Robertson.
.15 was within an hour and a half of the
wreck. Dave Laycock testified that it would take
approximately seven drinks to get to that point, plus
some additional ones to keep that level going. So you
can figure out if he hit Mr. Cox at this particular
time and the blood came at this particular time, when
would he have consumed those seven drinks. And the law
in this case is oerfectlv clear. I f vou're over a .08.
you are driving under'the influeice, and if you drive
under the influence and kill someone, then you should
be held accountable,
After Dave Laycock testified, you
further heard the testimony of Tony Evans. Now, Tony
Evans came upon the scene after Tonna Woolery. He also
had conversation with Mr. McKay and told you that he
smelled alcohol and saw his bloodshot eyes.' Both
officers saw the same impairment indications.
Tony made these measurements back here,
measured from the railroad track, took those pictures,
and found what he thought was the point of impact.
State's 18 is that gouge mark in the
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Davement. This is the issue that Ed Robertson covered
with you, this gouge mark and the tire prints that are
along each side of it. His interpretation was that
that gouge mark came from the car hitting the
motorcycle and the motorcycle's back tire stopping and
that caused the rubber burn, He addressed how the
motorcycle went sliding down the pavement and ended up
right where Tony says it ended up, and it should have
ended up there.
Ted's body ended up at this point at a
lesser distance than the motorcvcle, And it makes
sense, of course, with the diredion the Cadillac
traveled which ended up right there high-centeredon
that particular curbing.
As Tony was there at the scene, he was
taking measurements from Midland Boulevard, which is
somewhere out here. He took photographs. He saw what
he termed as vapor trails. And there's been a lot of
discussion about those vapor trails. We had a lot of
education yesterday. Iwas really confused with the
math. Ihope everybody else was too.
But those vapor trails and those pieces
and fragments laying on the roadway are only leading up
to the point where Ted's body is and that motorcycle
is, and then there's a big gouge mark right there.
m
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vehicle wreck that we've described here, and they
killed Ted Cox,
Fred Rice did not do speed based on one
factor. Fred Rice d ~ dnot do speed based on one
factor, Fred Rice did speed based on three, the
Cadillac, the body, and the motorcycle, and he came up
with approximately the same figures. Conservatively,
65 miles per hour is the speed he figured, and he had
the numbers. He even variated the numbers up there on
the witness stand. These were cold, hard, scientific
numbers, These aren't guesses and these aren't
daydreams. These are based upon the measurements of
Tony Evans out there at the scene.
And not only did he do it three ways, he
ended up doing it the fourth way right in front of this
Court with the splatter information. Remember when he
dropped his pen and that was like a time-distance
thing? He put it into the range that Icould
understand of the motor vehicle and how the motor
vehicle could impact the motorcycle pushing it forward.
State's 9, this impact right here to the
rear of the motorcycle is what we're talking about. It
was a very hard impact. I t wasn't a little bump. This
was a smack, a high degree of v e l ~ i t ywhich sent the
Cadillac, the motorcycle, and everything down the road.
7,

In this particular case, the big
question is was this vehicle out of control, and both
experts talked about that, Let's think about what Fred
Rice said first of all. He said he took those
measurements, he took the photographs, he looked at
them, he put together the information and provided a
report which indicated that this was a vehicle out of
control. I t was out of control back here, clear back
here before the railroad tracks, And as it's out of
control there, it's coming across the railroad track
leaving those scuff marks. Not tire marks. Scuff
marks. That shows out of control,
I t veers into the lane here, and Ed
talked about an angle, talked about an angle and, bang,
it hits into that motorcycle and sends it flying. This
is an action out of control, You lose control here,
you overcorrect to go back into your lane, and thars
what resulted in this impact, Why Mike wasn't hit and
Monique wasn't hit, it's somebody bigger than us with
them that day.
Ted was. Hopefully, Ted never saw what
was coming. The paramedicstold you what his injuries
were. He had a fractured skull. He had broken bones
in his arms and legs. He had a broken neck. These
particular injuries are consistent
with the motor
In
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Fred Rice testified that those lio~iids 7
didn't have time to s ill out until they got further
down the road, whici is consistent with velocity in
that cup thing that he showed us. So all that
testified to is consistent with the facts and the
measurements that Tony Evans took and is consistent
with the eyewitness testimony of Steve Wood, Mike, and
Monique.
And you also saw this motorcycle, so you
know how hard it was hit This motorcycle was hit so
hard, State's 10, that Tony Evans had to pull that
license plate out of the back side of that motorcycle.
I t was embedded in there. He didn't even see it at
first. And that license plate goes to the Cadillac.
The other thing that Tony Evans found at
the crime scene, 22 and 23, are pictures of the license
piate. You can study these more closely when you get
back in the jury room. And Mr. Paulson showed you how
the brackets on this attach to the light fixture that
was affixed to the back of Ted's motorcycle. Three
people testified they saw that light there that night.
Mike, Monique, and Mr. Paulson, they saw that light.
This license plate was aftixed to it. Without the
light, the brackets of this license plate wouldn't have
held it in place.
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Ted was very proud of this motorcycle he
called Mumm. He'd had her longer than Mikey's been
alive, and that motorcycle was a big part of who he
was. He went to that shop every Saturday, His friends
rode. This is his fun and his enjoyment, and he took
pride in her, and there's this taillight right there
with his license plate on it. Why would he take that
off? It wouldn't be safe. They check on that for each
other. I t wouldn't be safe.
Because of Mr. McKay's careless driving
and his choice to consume alcohol, Ted Cox was killed
violentlyy,There's brain matter along the road. There
was brain matter around him and coming out his ears.
He had breakage. He flew through the air quite a
distance. His glove, his glasses, the vest, everything
flew off of him as he was pushed by the weight of the
Cadillac.
Remember, Ed Robertson testifred that
Cadillac probably weighs 4,000 pounds. There's no
pavement that's even going to stop that Cadillac, and
that's what hit Mr. Cox at 65 miles per hour from
behind sending him vaulting through the air.
What about Ted Cox's drinking that
night? It was the last night of his life. He was
visiting friends. He saw his mother. He was,
71
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according to the experts, in his proper lane of traffic
right here. He wasn't swerving. He didn't pull out in
front of Mr. McKay. He was in his proper lane of
traffic. He was drinking, true, but drinking doesn't
involve the death penalty.
Was there any contributing factors I
asked each of the experts. The only contributing
factor was that he was there. This was not his fault*
And Ted had a good life. He shared it
with his loved ones, and they are robbed of him because
of the choices that were made by Mr. McKay, the choices
to consume alcohol, the choices to drive a car, and the
choices to drive that car in a reckless and dangerous
manner. Because of those choices, he killed Ted Cox
and robbed him of life. And for this, he should be
held accountable.
This is not an accident, This is
willful conduct. What you need to do is consider the
facts, the testimony, the blood alcohol content, what
the reconstructionist said, what the eyewitnesses say,
because if you think about it in the big picture,
you11 see what !iteve Wood said about speed and
position and what both the experts said about speed and
position are the same. This was no accident.
I'm going to be able to address you
74

1 again as soon as Mr. Harris is finished, but we would
2 aik you to once again consider all the'facts before you
3 make a decision. Thank you.
4
M E COURT: Thank you, Ms, Bond.
5
Mr. Harris, you may proceed.
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MR. HARKS: I f it please the Court,
counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I'm a Cubs
fan, but how about those Red Sox? Iwish we were here
talking about baseball rather than what we're talking
about this morning.
This is an unfortunate and tragic
accident. It's tragic to both families and to their
friends. But, ladies and gentlemen, what this is is an
accident.
This is what is known as closing
arguments. It's the time that the attorneys get an
opportunity to visit with you as jurors. What we say
to you is not evidence. Iwant you to be perfedtly
clear about that, I f your recollection of the evidence
is different than mine, you rely on yours. I'll not
try to mislead you, but as I've indicated, if your
recollection is different than mine, you know what you
lr

need to do.
Let me talk about this instruction that
you have received. That instruction lists those six
items that the prosecutor has put up on that board, but
unfortunately or intentionally, the prosecutor has
failed to put one other additional element that is part
of that instruction, and I'm going to take the liberty
of putting it on there because as youget that
instruction in the jury room, you'll notice that there
is a number seven, and that number seven has the word
"cause" in it.
The way the vehicular manslaughter
statute is written. it is written in the format that
the driving of the vehicle and the commission of an
ilnlawf~lact that causes death is a violation of that
statute.
In this particular instance, in order
for there to be a violation of the statute, you must
find that Shane McKay drove the vehicle -- we don't
deny that -- on a highway, That's obvious. It's
alleged by the prosecution that he was either under the
influence or had a BA greater than .08 or .08 or
greater.
And they stopped right there because
they take the position that if you do that, you are
7r,
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possible that his BA was less than .08.
He said it would take seven Ithink
it was seven drinks, Idon't know how many of you are
familiar with drinks. I'm not. I had learned this.
But supposing he had a Long Island iced tea just before
he left where he was, that contained enough alcohol to
get you there, but there's an absorption rate, there is
an elimination rate.
And it may have been a ,15 an hour and
forty minutes after the accident, but as their expert
says, it could very well have been less than .08 at the
time of the accident. Ladies and gentlemen, that is a
reasonable doubt,
The prosecution wants you also to
believe that the injuries received in the accident
caused the death of Mr, Cox, and it seems clearly
apparent that that's the case. And because it seemed
apparent to the people in charge of this, no autopsy
was ordered,
Ladies and gentlemen, I've been either a
prosecutor or defense attorney for over thirty years
and I've handled lots of homicide cases. This is the
first case that an autopsy hasn't been performed.
And I'll tell you why an autopsy is
performed. It's not only to establish cause of death,

guilty. That's not the instruction on the law that has
been given you by Judge Hoff because it contains the
additional word, that must cause the death of Mr. Cox.
There's another instruction that needs
to be talked about briefly, and that is that in every
criminal offense, there must exist the joint operation
of act and intent. And where is the act and the intent
in the evidence that you've received that caused the
death of Mr. Cox?
Let me just address some issues having
to do with evidence in this case. And there's a number
of issues that you'll have to sort out with reference
to the testimony of Mr, Warren, Ms. Crownhart, and
Scott Paulson. There is the issue of the position of
the bikes on the roadway. There is the relationship of
those bikes with each other.
There is the issue of the drinking of
Mr. Cox. You'll remember that they said that he'd only
had one drink, that he was essentially a non-drinker,
and yet, it's not possible under the law or under the
facts that a person driving on the roadway with a ,I9
BA was not a factor in what happened.
But I'm verv well aware of human nature
and I know that friends and, in this case, brothers,
shade the truth. I think Scott Paulson and all said,

--

37

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

39

you know, we will cover for each other, and that's
going to be important later on in my argument, But
it's your assessment of the credibility of those
witnesses and the assessment of where they say things
were in the entire context or the totality of the
circumstances of this case.
You have heard evidence, and Iwould
submit to you that Shane was very much traumatized by
what happened. They described him as crying, and the
picture that was put on the screen indicates that he
was clying. It's obvious that his eyes were red. He
had been battered by Warren.
Ithink he said that Ithink there
was some evidence that while he was crying, he was
praying. He kept repeating it was an accident, I
didn't mean to hit him, he popped out of nowhere, I
didn't see him, it was an accident. He kept repeating
that over and over,
Now, the prosecution wants you to
believe that at the time of this accident, Shane was
under the influence or over the legal limit. And even
though there was a BA of ,IS, as Irecall,
approximately an hour and forty minutes after the
accident, the State's expert, the witness they called,
said that at the time of the accident, it's entirely

--
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but it's to establish that cause of death to the
exclusion of every other cause and to establish
evidence,
MS. BOND: Your Honor, I'm going to
object to him testifying about some facts that were not
in evidence.
THE COURT: I'IIoverrule the objection.
Ithink he can make his argument. I'IIcontinue to
entertain that issue if you want to revisit it.
MR. HARRIS: Idon't know if any of you
watch Law and Order on television, Approximately a
week ago on that episode of the program, there was a
situation that occurred I didn't see the program,
but it's been related to me -- that a person, a
pedestrian, was struck by a car.
The injuries and cause of death seemed
clearly evident by what occurred. When they performed
the autopsy, they discovered a subdural hematoma that
had occurred as the result of an occurrence some time
prior, and it was that subdural hematoma that was the
cause of death, not what appeared to be the apparent
injuries of the carlpedestrian accident. Ladies and
gentlemen, that's another element of reasonable doubt.
Idon't know how many of you watch Bill
O'Reilly and The O'Reilly Factor on the Fox News
an
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illuminated by the headlight.
And I agree with him that it takes 204
feet to stop, but what he did not include in that
number is some reaction time on the part of the driver
to perceive and to apply the brake, Once the brake was
applied, it's 204 feet, but there is a lag time in
order to get there. That's how facts are massagedand
manipulated.
And so Iguess what I'm wing to point
out there is that he's telling the truth as far as the
truth goes, but the answer is not complete. And
because it's not complete, it's misleading. The fact
that there is a reaction time there extends, in that
instance, the stopping distance by almost a third. So
instead of stopping at 250 feet within the headlight,
you stop at 290 feet.
In addition, Inoticed the tendency to
filibuster, to manipulate information. But, ladies and
gentlemen, you are the arbiters of their credibility
and their testimony.
One of the things about this case that
has been a puzzle to me for a long time and is a
disagreement between the State's case and their experts
and me and my expert, and that has to do with this
point of impact because that is an important

channel, but he describes his program as being a
no-spin zone, and he uses the word -- a word that I
learned, Inever heard it before then, but he used the
word "blowvitate," which means, in the vernacular that
I'm familiar with, don't baffle me with your BS.
And let me talk about that in context
with some testimony, And in this particular case, each
side is represented by an attorney. Each side has had
expert witnesses come and testify. There's been a lot
of evidence regarding credentials and qualification and
that one side's credentials, because they belong to
organizations, that makes them somehow more credible
and more important than the other side.
But to put that again in context, I'm
licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho but I
don't beiong to the American Bar Association, Idon't
belong to the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association, Idon't
belong to the Idaho Criminal --or the Idaho Lawyers
for Criminal Justice. Does that make me any less a
20 lawyer qualified to come before ou and represent my
21 client in this case? Iam license( to Yoractice
. before
22 the courts in the state of Idaho, befdre the federal
23 courts in Idaho, before the Ninth Circuit, and before
24 the United States Supreme Court, but Idon't belong to
25 these voiuntaty organizations.
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Ms. Bond, in the course of the
examination of Mr. Freeman, worked him over about that
affidavit. Unfortunately, Iwas the one that drafted
the affidavit. And we were in a huny and he signed
it, but that's what happened.
Let me come back and talk about the
exoerts for iust a minute, and oarticularlv Mr. Rice
a d Mr. ~06ertsonand some iontradictions in their
testimony opinions.
First, Rice testified that the proof of
impact where it is on that diagram over there was
caused by the rim the rim of the rear wheel of the
13 motorcycle. Robertson said it was a cross-member on
14 the Cadillac. Rice said it was a straight-on
15 collision, Robertson said it was at an angle.
And they gave a lot of testimony, but
16
17 let me tly and give you an example of the subtlety of
18 the testimony and the ability to massage and manipulate
19 facts to comport with their formulas and so forth,
Talking about that no-spin zone, you
20
21 remember Mr. Robertson talking about a requirement that
22 a headlight had to illuminate the road 250 feet ahead
23 and that he used Ibelieve it was 65 miles per hour and
24 that a car stops in 204 feet and, therefore, he should
25 have stopped because that is less than the 250 feet
42
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consideration for you as jurors in this case,
Where is the point of impact? You
listened to the testimony of Mr. Wood. Mr. Wood
testified that had the car crossed over his iane, went
off the left edge of the road and tried to come back,
there would have been a head-on collision with him.
You listened to his testimony as he said with reference
to the car that was coming down in the other lane of
traffic, it crossed, he believed, the centerline, went
back into that lane, I t never did come completely into
his iane of traffic. And again, on this diagram, if
that occurred, it would have been much further down the
road to the east than what is depicted here. He would
have seen that. He never saw it. He never testified
to it.
He testified as to what happened, and
20
Mr. Rice's comment about his testimony was, well, he
didn't perceive it correctly, he didn't see what he
saw. Why is that important with reference to this
point of impact and why is it important with the
21 testimony of the experts that reconstructed this
22 accident?
It's important because the State's
24 experts did not reconstruct this accident. What they
25 have done is they have taken Officer Evans' -- yeah,
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Tony Evans' theory of this case and they have defended
it. And Brant Freeman looked at these same facts and
reconstructed the accident as to what happened.
And you remember -- and I don't remember
whether it was Mr. Rice or Mr, Robertson that testified
that reconstruction of an accident is taking all the
pieces of a puzzle, all of the elements that are there,
and putting them together and figuring out what
happened.
Now, that wasn't really what happened
here. What really happened is that they, as experts
for the State, took the theory of this accident
formulated by Mr. -- Officer Evans and defended it.
Brant Freeman took those same facts, totality of the
facts, and in my judgment, determined what really
happened, and this is why. You'll remember during the
course of the trial -Could Ihave Exhibit A, please?
You're going to have this when you get
in the jury room, but during the course of the trial, I
had the witnesses look at this numerous times. And if
you go to page 3 page 1and 2 depict the roadway of
Karcher before vou aet to the railroad tracks and it's
got what purpohs t i be where the Cadillac left tire
left the roadway, came back on the roadway. The second

--
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. has the railroad tracks. I t has the
2 point -- what Tony Evans alleges the point of impact to
3 be. And then it has the distances from that point to
where Mr. Cox was, to where the motorcycle was, to
where the tire marks first went onto the curb and where
the Cadillac came to rest.
And up in the right-hand corner of that,
you'll also notice the vapor trial of number two, which
is the Cadillac, vapor trail number one, which is the
motorcycle. And you'll ail probably remember the
testimony having to do with those vapor trails or, as
Mr. Freeman describes it, the liquid debris.
The third page of this exhibit is
important for you once you get in the jury room to
discuss this accident You will notice that at the
bottom of this exhibit, there is a gouge mark
purporting to be where the point of impact occurred.
That gouge mark corresponds with the gouge mark on the
second page, which is where they allege the point of
20 impact was.
Coming back to the third page, this was
22 measured bv Officer Corder of the ISP and Officer
23 Evans. ~ r o mthe gouge mark to a point 83.1 feet
24 downrange from that gouge mark, there are no marks, no
25 marks. We're not talking about liquid debris or vapor

I
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trail. We're talking about marks. From 220 feet,
which is from this pointto this point, it's labeled
rear wheel skid mrirk of motoriycle,220 feet.
If you listen to Mr. Robertson and
Mr, Rice, the motorcycle -- when this accident
occurred, the motorcycle laid right down and skidded
along the pavement all the way to where it came to
rest. There are no marks for the first 83 feet. There
should have been marks, and there were none.
The only thing that can explain that is
that the motorcycle was airborne for that 83.1 feet and
finally it landed and then the marks began. That
contradicts - and it would be impossible in the first
place because of weight and gravity, but it contradicts
the testimony of Mr. Rice and Mr. Robertson because
there would have been marks and there were none. And
then finally, there's another 87 feet where it finally
came to rest from the marks that were put on the road.
And then we come back to these distances
having to do with the vapor trail, and those are the
numbers in the upper right-hand corner of page 2 of the
exhibit. The distance that they have established on
these notes is the vaoor trail of the motorcvcle
started at 780 feet west, and that is by a p'rocess of
subtraction, if my math is correct. And I don't claim
47

to be the areatest mathematician. but it's 74.5 feet
from this Goint of impact. The vapor trail of the
Cadillac starts at 790 feet west, and that number -where have Igot it here on my notes -- is 73.5 feet.
Excuse me, It's 79 feet.
So how do you put this together? What's
the meaning of that? The vapor trails and the marks
correlate very closely. The debris field starts
downrange from 83.1 feet. That's where the debris was
found. We know that if the point of impact was where
they say it is, there would be marks on the roadway by
both vehicles, particularly the motorcycle, during that
83.1 feet where they measured. They looked. They
never found any.
ThaYs what Brant Freeman was testifying
about because that has to mean that the point of impact
is down there where this 83.1 feet, that number is. He
said that it has to be in close proximity to that
number. That makes sense to me.
As you look at the totality of the
evidence of this case, the theory of this accident
propounded by Officer Evans doesn't make sense. It
doesn't make sense for a number of reasons, not only
the testimony of Mr. Wood, but the marks on the roadway
as they come across the railroad tracks.
4R
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And again, that was a puzzle to me
because Ibelieve it was Mr, Rice that said, well,
these are scuff marks, the ones that come from the
eastbound lane into the westbound lane, and they look
identical to the marks that are in the westbound
lane -- or excuse me -- yeah, to the eastbound lane,
but those are not scuff marks, we don't know what they
are, And you look at them and they look identical.
And Brant Freeman testified that he looked at them and
blew the pictures up, looked at them under a magnifying
glass and could see no difference. That doesn't make
Sense.
The speed doesn't make sense because
what happens with the point of impact with the State is
you've got to elevate those speeds. X's actually 71
miles an hour, And Mr, Rice hedged a little bit saying
it was 65, but his calculation is actually 71 miles per
hour, I f he was off the left edge of the roadway, in
1.1seconds, you've got to cross over across the
railroad tracks and get situated in the westbound lane
of traffic to directly collide with the motorcycle. I
suppose that's possible, but the probability of it, of
that occurring, you know, it just isn't there, That
dwsn't make sense.
Ladies and gentlemen, when you retire to
49
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the jury room, you bring with you your common sense and
your experience, what makes sense to you. And Isubmit
that, at least to me, what makes sense is not the
theory of the accident that Officer Evans came up with.
That just doesn't make sense to me at all.
If Brant Freeman is correct and the
point of impact is downrange from where they got it to
the close proximi of 83.1 feet, that significantly
reduces the spe of the vehicles. That is reasonable
doubt.
A number of years ago Iwas in a trial,
and Ithought the case was one of those slam-dunk
cases, there isn't any way in the world that you can
lose it, And I was taught a lesson by a very good
trial lawyer, one of the better ones in Idaho, and he
said that in the course of a trial, there is usually
something that occurs, probably that seems to be
insignificant, but as you analyze it, it really
determines what really is the case.
And so since then, Ihave sort of paid
attention to that, and Ithink there's such a thing in
this case, and I'm going to start with this. This is
the motorcycle. It's the pre-accident motorcycle. You
listened to all the witnesses testify that, as far as
they knew, this was an identical representationof the
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accident -- or excuse me -of the motorcycle at the
time of the accident. There wasn't any changes. Some
of those witnesses worked on it, but there weren't any
changes. That's the way it was. That's the way it
was.
And yet when they got to the scene of
the accident, the only thing that was found therewas
the license plate, and they took pictures of the
here. Is
license Plate. We've aot those ~hotoam~hs
there a'difference betkeen the kens6 piate on the
ground and the license plate on the motorcycle?
And when you get in the jury room and
you look at these photographs, you will see that there
is an acorn nut missing from the license plate and you
will notice that that nut is missing on the bottom
left. And you'll notice that in the photograph of the
license plate on the ground at the scene, that nut
that's missing is the upper right. What does that
signify? What does that mean?
If you look at this let me try and
explain it as best Ican. When it was first
photographed, as Iunderstand it, it was face down, the
numbers were face down. That license Plate was
originall part of a - there was a bracket that is
part o f t e unit that fits the taillight, the taillight
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housing, and there is a piece of steel that fits on
the --that would fit on the back of the license plate
which supports and provides protection and support to
the license plate.
We all know how flimsy license plates
..
are. But this piece of steel encapsulates the license
plate, and it is that piece of steel to which these
bolts that I've indicated to you from the other
photograph, that's mounted to the bracket that is part
of that taillight housing, and that's what attaches
them all together.
It's obvious that that license plate was
broken, I t was broken away from the taillight. WeU,
when did that occur? I t did not occur when this
accident happened. I t occurred sometime prior to that.
It occurred sometime between August 16 when that
photograph was taken and the time of the accident,
And then let me bring you back to Scott
Paulson's testimony. Scott Paulson testified that he
and Mr. Cox were together and they had a run-in with
another guy on a motorcycle, They took their
motorcycle and chased that guy down, cornered him, and
there was an altercation. He testified that there was
damage done to the motorcycles. He testified there was
damage done to Mr. Cox's motorcycle. He testified
C?
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there was a dent in the fuel tank. He did not testify
that there was damage done to the taillight, but it
certainly could have occurred then. But, ladies and
gentlemen, it occurred sometime between when that
photograph was taken and the accident because the bolts
are changed.
I f you'll remember the testimony of all
the witnesses -- well, most of the witnesses anyway
there is no lens glass from the taillight on the ground
or anywhere at the scene of the accident. I f you look
at the metal, and they describe it as being pot metal,
probably is, but that is a large piece of metal that
houses that taillight. None of that metal was found.
Officer Evans testified he searched for hours trying to
find it. He didn't find it. Why didn't he find it?
The license plate was there. That taillight and that
housing was not there. There was not a taillight on
the Cox motorcycle that night.
Idon't know when the damage to it
occurred, It certainly could have occurred when Scott
Paulson and he had the altercation with the other guy
on September 20th. I t could be that they ordered
another one in and it hadn't arrived yet so they hadn't
put it on and they attached the license plate with a
wire or something because he was driving around, But
53

MS, BOND: The State in this case had no
intention of leaving out number seven --this is why we
get the last word here -- because number seven is all
about Ted Cox. That's what this case is about. That's
what we're going to focus on here once again in our
rebuttal is number seven. It sums it all up because
Mr. Harris didn't give you the whole picture either.
Let's put it down here in totality. And
the defendant's, which is Mr. McKay, operation of the
motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox, a human
being. He did cause the death of Ted Cox. That's
exactly what this case is about. I'm glad he pointed
that out for me because that is the most important
element exactly, dead on.
Ted Cox had a life and he had a family
and he deserved to live. He was killed by a driver
that was under the influence of alcohol. You heard it,
this is an accident. This is no accident. This is
willful conduct,
We should rely on the testimony of an
expert who hasn't had any updated training for fourteen
years, who is paid a large amount of money to come up
with a theory that fits for Mr, McKay, an expert that
didn't come up with any numbers, didn't do computations
for you, an expert whose attention to detail is quite

the taillight was not there. And as Mr. Freeman
testified, you can't yield to what you can't see.
And if you come back to cause see,
that's number seven on the board that the prosecutor
left out -- what was the cause? The cause was no
taillight. He couldn't see it. Mr. Cox was driving.
We know that he had a -19 at the time of the accident.
Was that a contributor, the fact that he was driving
out there without a taillight? I n my judgment,
certainly.
Ladies and gentlemen, reasonable doubt
has been shown. There is reasonable doubt in this
case. Irecognize, and Mr. McKay and his family
recognize, how tragic and unfortunate this situation
is. But, ladies and gentlemen, it was an accident.
Iask you to return a verdict of not
guilty because the State has not met its burden of
proof, and the only way justice will be accomplished in
this case is by a return of not guilty.
Again, Ithank you so much for your
attention. for vour time that vou've soent. that vou've
given in considering this matter. Think you veh much.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Harris.

evident from the affidavit, that's who we're supposed
to rely on?
And for some reason, he knew there was
no taillight? Whose fault is it that that taillight's
gone? The car hits it full speed, almost 70 miles per
hour, and it's gone and that's Ted's fault? There was
a screw found by Ed Robertson and the other mechanic in
the fender with a piece of pot metal on it with a fresh
break. Remember that testimony. Remember that
testimony because that's important, A fresh break, pot
metal, explodes, a huge crash, lots of power, That was
not Ted's fault. Ted was not driving the Cadillac.
Mr. McKay was driving the Cadillac. He was driving the
Cadillac after he had drinks and he was driving fast.
This is also what this case is about.
It's about the obvious. Well, they didn't do an
autopsy, Let's take a look at this. It's real small
here, but not really when you get this picture. You
will see this right here. That's what's left of
Mr. Cox. That's a piece of brain matter that's along
the highway. Let's not look at the obvious. Let's
look at the little tiny detail.
They're asking you to speculate that
there's no taillight so there's no responsibility here.
Do we want to decide this case based on soeculation or

--
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punished. And in this case, a .IS is quite indicative
of over the legal limit.
Number seven is the crux of this case
because Ted Cox is the one that paid the price here.
The State is going to ask you to return a guilty
verdict for Mr. McKay. Thank you.

do we want to decide this case based on fact, a fact
like depicted here, a fact like brain matter, a fact
like a license plate shoved all the way into this
motorcycle that Tony had to pull out of there, facts
like a gouge mark, which is a mark, it's a mark prior
to 83 feet?
We're trying to manipulate the facts
here, manipulating the information? Every one of the
State's ex eits had numbers, they had credentials.
They do !ti is work currently. They are up to date.
They teach others. They have a law enforcement
background and training and it's current,
He has an expert that says it's police
policy to seize vehicles, which both officers said it's
not the case, They don't keep these vehicles unless
requested by the prosecutor's office.
And intent, a d and intent. Another
good point made by Mr. Harris because the act here, the
act of how he drove that vehicle, running off the road
out of control, coming back onto the road at a high
rate of speed. Sure, the car's a good car. I t could
have made it, but the driver wasn't capable. The
driver was impaired. Reckless conduct slamming into
the back of Ted Cox. The act itself is indicative of
what the intent was, Mr. McKay made the choices here.
c7
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He made the choices to drink and drive and drive fast,
not Ted Cox.
Iwant to address Steve Woods again once
more. Steve Woods was looking at the motorcycles
this is his testimony -- and when he looked up, he saw
the car halfway into his lane. Completely consistent
with the State's theory in this case.
They want you to believe that the
splatters and where the vehicles hit are clear down
here because it lessens the speed, of course, but does
that really make sense? Imean, you saw it right here
In court. Those fluids are not going to fall down if a
car is moving --let me see if Ican get it right.
Every second it moves 90 feet if it3 going 60 miles
per hour, That'squite a force. That's quite a push.
It's taking it down the road a way before it dumps it,
and that only makes sense. We saw it happen here in
court with the cup. So really, blowvitating? Who's
blowvitating here?
We want fact, we want the truth because
that's what justice is about, and Ted deserves it. He
deserves the truth and he deserves justice and so does
everybody else in society. I f somebody takes everybody
else's life on the road into their hands and dares to
go out and drive under the influence, they should be
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48A Automobiles
-

48AVII Offenses
48AVII(A) In General
48Ak342 Homicide
48Ak344 k. Manslaughter.
Most Cited Cases
Negligence on part of defendant was
required element of vehicular manslaughter.
LC. 6 18-4006, subd. 3(c).
Statutes 361 Q="181(1)

Background: Defendant was convicted in a
jury trial in the District Court, Fourth
Judicial District, Valley County, George
David Carey, J., and Henry R. Boomer, 111,
Magistrate, of misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Lansing,
J., held that:

a negligence on part

of defendant was
required element of vehicular manslaughter;

361 Statutes
-

=I

Construction and Operation
361VI(A)
General
Rules
of
Construction
361kl80 Intention of Legislature
361k181 In General
361k181(1) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361 -184

361 Statutes
-

criminal complaint was
not
jurisdictionally defective for not alleging
that defendant's failure to maintain his lane
of travel was product of negligent act or
omission; and

Construction and Operation
361VI(A)
General
Rules
of
Construction
361k180 Intention of Legislature
361k184 k. Policy and Purpose
of Act. Most Cited Cases

3
(J jury instructions were erroneous for not

Statutes 361 -208

requiring finding that defendant was
negligent before he could be found guilty of
vehicular manslaughter.

Vacated and remanded.
West Headnotes
Automobiles 48A -344

a

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VKA)
General
Rules
of
Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and
Intrinsic Aids to Construction
361k208 k. Context and Related
Clauses. Most Cited Cases
When a court must engage in statutory
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construction, its duty is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature; in so
doing, appellate court looks to the context of
the statutory language in question and the
public policy behind the statute.
Statutes 361 -223.2(.5)
361 Statutes
-

Construction and Operation
361VI(A)
General
Rules
of
Construction
361k223
Construction
with
Reference to Other Statutes
361k223.2 Statutes Relating to
the Same Subject Matter in General
361k223.2(.5) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
When an ambiguous statute is part of a
larger statutory scheme, appellate court not
only focuses upon the language of the
ambiguous statute, but appellate court also
looks at other statutes relating to the same
subject matter and consider them together in
order to discern legislative intent; even when
a statute is not ambiguous on its face,
judicial construction might nevertheless be
required to harmonize the statute with other
legislative enactments on the same subject.
Statutes 361 -241(1)
361 Statutes
Construction and Operation
361VI(B) Particular Classes of
Statutes
361k241 Penal Statutes
361k241(1) k. In General.
Cited Cases
When a court must engage in statutory
construction, appellate court is obligated to
apply the doctrine of lenity, which requires
courts to construe ambiguous criminal
statutes in favor of the accused.

aAutomobiles 48A -351.1
48A Automobiles
-

48AVni Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak35 1 Charging Instrument;
Summons or Ticket
48Ak35 1.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Criminal complaint was not jurisdictionally
defective for not alleging that defendant's
failure to maintain his lane of travel was
product of negligent act or omission in
vehicular
manslaughter
prosecution;
although complaint stating that defendant
slid his vehicle into oncoming northbound
lane was defective for failure to allege any
negligence or other culpable mental state,
both the first and second alternatives in
complaint that defendant drove carelessly,
imprudently or inattentively and drove at
speed greater than was reasonable and
prudent under conditions made clear
references to negligence. LC. 6 18-4006,
subd. 3(c).
Indictment and Information 210
-60
210 Indictment and Information
Requisites and Sufficiency of
Accusation
210k58 Subject-Matter of Allegations
210k60 k. Elements and Incidents
of Offense in General. Most Cited Cases
A charging document will be deemed so
flawed that it fails to confer jurisdiction on
the court if the facts alleged are not made
criminal by statute or if the document fails
to state facts essential to establish the
offense charged.

121Criminal Law 110 6="1032(5)
110 Criminal Law
-
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11OXXIV Review
Presentation
and
11OXXrV(E)
Reservation in Lower Court of Grounds of
Review
1 IOXXIV(E)l In General
110k1032
Indictment
or
Information
110k1032(5) k. Requisites
and Sufficiency of Accusation. Most Cited

Cases
Indictment and Information 210 -193
210 Indictment and Information
-

210XIV Waiver of Defects and
Objections
210k193 k. Defects and Objections
Which May Be Cured or Waived.
Cited Cases
If an alleged deficiency is raised by a
defendant before trial or entry of a guilty
plea, the charging document must state all
facts essential to establish the charged
offense; but if the information is not
challenged until after a verdict or guilty
plea, it will be liberally construed in favor of
validity, and a technical deficiency that does
not prejudice the defendant will not provide
a basis to set the conviction aside.

on appeal unless it is so defective that it
does not, by any fair or reasonable
construction, charge an offense for which
the defendant was convicted.
Automobiles 48A -357(13)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak357 Instructions
48Ak357(13) k. Homicide.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 48Ak357)
Jury instructions were erroneous for not
requiring finding that defendant was
negligent before he could be found guilty of
vehicular manslaughter; one instruction told
jurors that if they found defendant caused
victim's death by failing to maintain his lane
of travel while driving, they were required to
find defendant guilty of vehicular
manslaughter, but another instruction
implied that defendant would not be guilty if
he was not negligent. LC. 6 18-4006, subd.
3(c).

J
J
O
J
Criminal Law 110 -822(1)
110 Criminal Law
-

181.Criminal Law 110 -1032(5)
110 Criminal Law
110XXR Review
11OXXIV(E)
Presentation
and
Reservation in Lower Court of Grounds of
Review
11OXXIWE)I In General
110k1032
Indictment
or
Information
110k1032(5) k. Requisites
and Sufficiency of Accusation. Most Cited

Cases

Trial
1lOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity,
Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k822 Construction and Effect
of Charge as a Whole
110k822(11k. In General.
Cited Cases
When reviewing jury instructions, appellate
court asks whether the instructions as a
whole, and not individually, fairly and
accurately reflect applicable law.
Criminal Law 110 -772(1)

If the challenge to a charging document is
tardy, the charging document will be upheld

110 Criminal Law
-
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1
Trial
11OXX(G) Instructions: Necessity,
Re~uisites,and Sufficiency
110k772 ~lementsand Incidents of
Offense, and Defenses in General
110k772(1) k. In General.
Cited Cases
A trial court must charge the jury with all
rules of law material to the determination of
the defendant's guilt or innocence; therefore,
the jury must be instructed on all elements
of the charged offense.
Criminal Law 110 -778(5)

1 10 Criminal Law
1
Trial
I IOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity,
Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k778 Presumptions and Burden
of Proof
110k778(5) k. Shifting Burden
of Proof. Most Cited Cases
The omission of an element of the crime
impermissibly lightens the prosecution's
burden of proof.

1131Criminal Law 110 $==51181.5(1)
110 Criminal Law
-

11OXXIV Review
1lOXXIV(U> Determination and
Disposition of Cause
110k118I.5 Remand in General;
Vacation
110k1181.5(1) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
When it is not possible to determine whether
the jury reached its verdict on a correct or
incorrect legal theory, an appellate court
must vacate the conviction and remand the
case for a new trial.
**411 Wiebe & Fouser, Caldwell, for

appellant. Thomas A. Sullivan argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney
General; Melissa Nicole Moody, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Melissa Nicole Moody argued.
LANSING, Judge.
*264 Appellant Hugh S. McNair was
convicted of misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter.
The issues he raises on
appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the
criminal complaint and the jury instructions,
require that we determine whether
negligence on the part of the defendant is an
element of vehicular manslaughter under
Idaho Code 6 18-4006(31(c). We hold that
it is and therefore vacate the judgment and
remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

On the evening of February 9, 2001, Hugh
S. McNair was driving southbound on
Highway 55 between McCall and Boise in
wintry conditions.
As he started to
negotiate a curve, McNair's vehicle crossed
into the opposite lane and collided head-on
with another vehicle.
Injuries from the
collision resulted in the death of Reed
Ostermeier, the passenger in the other
McNair was charged with
vehicle.
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter,
18-4006(3)(~).
The second amended complaint, upon which
McNair went to trial, alleged:
That the defendant, HUGH S. MCNAIR ...
did, unlawfully but without malice kill Reed
Elvin Ostermeier, a human being, by
operating a motor vehicle ... in the
commission of an unlawful act or acts, not
amounting to a felony, without gross
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negligence, to wit; the defendant was
driving southbound at said location,
carelessly, imprudently or inattentively by
not paying attention and/or at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under
the conditions or when approaching an
intersection and curve or failing to observe
special hazards that may be in existence by
reasons of weather or highway conditions
that caused him to apply his brakes, locking
up his wheels and/or sliding his vehicle into
the oncoming northbound lane striking the
vehicle driven by Heidi M. Ostermeier
killing Reed Elvin Ostermeier.
All of which is a misdemeanor in violation
of Idaho Code 18-4006(3)fc), and *265
**412 against the peace, power and dignity
of the State of Idaho.
At trial, the defense theory was that
McNair's vehicle hit a patch of ice on the
road as he was entering a curve, which
caused his vehicle to skid into the other lane
despite McNair's exercise of due care.
McNair was nevertheless found guilty by the
jury.
McNair's conviction and sentence were
affirmed by the district court on intermediate
appeal. On further appeal to this Court,
McNair argues that (1) the criminal
complaint was jurisdictionally defective
because it did not adequately allege that
and (2) the
McNair was negligen<
magistrate failed to properly instruct the jury
that negligence is an element of vehicular
m a n s ~ a u g h t e r .Both
~ of these issues relate
to the State's allegation that McNair caused
the victim's death by "sliding his vehicle
into the oncoming northbound lane striking
the vehicle driven by Heidi Ostermeier...."
Neither that portion of the amended
complaint nor the related jury instruction
expressly incorporated an element of
negligence.

FNl. McNair also asserts that the
magistrate imposed an excessive
sentence, an issue that we do not
reach.

ANALYSIS
A. Negligence as an Element of Vehicular

Manslaughter

J
l
JBoth McNair's claim that the complaint
was jurisdictionally defective and his claim
of error in the jury instructions require that
we
determine
whether
vehicular
manslaughter may be a strict liability
offense or requires some degree of
negligence. Although the State conceded
before the district court that negligence is an
element of the offense, it now argues to the
contrary.
On the date of the accident, vehicular
manslaughter was defined in LC. 6 184006(3)fc) as follows:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice. It is of three
(3) kinds:

....

3. Vehicular-in which the operation of a
motor vehicle is a significant cause
contributing to the death because of:
(a) the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, with gross
negligence; or
(b) the commission of a violation of
18-8004 or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(c) the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, without gross
negligence.'NZ
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FN2. This statute was amended in
2002 to include a human embryo or
fetus in the definition of a human
being. 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.
350 9 2.
McNair was charged under subpart (c)
which, on its face, does not include an
element of negligence, but requires only an
"unlawful act" that significantly contributes
to the cause of death. The State contends
that McNair committed an "unlawful act"
when his vehicle crossed the center line, and
even if it occurred without his negligence,
he is guilty of vehicular manslaughter.
McNair argues that the Idaho courts have
interpreted LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c) to include
an element of negligence and that, if the
statute is interpreted to create a strict
liability offense, it would violate the
constitutional right of due process.
F X Presumably, the unlawful act to
which the State refers is a violation
of 1.C. 6 6 49-630, 49-631 andlor
49-637.
Implicit in the State's
argument is the proposition that
these statutes prohibiting driving to
the left of the center line create
criminal liability even if the driver
was exercising due care. That is a
proposition that we need not address.

121r31141 When a court must engage in
statutory construction, its duty is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the
legislature. State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152,
154.75 P.3d 206.208 (Ct.Apo.2003). In so
doing, we look to the context of the statutory
language in question and the public policy
behind the statute. Id.; State v. Cudd, 137

Idaho 625. 627. 51 P.3d 439. 441
(Ct.App.2002). When an ambiguous statute
is part of a larger statutory scheme, we not
only focus upon the language of the
ambiguous statute, but also look at other
statutes relating to the same *266 **413
subject matter and consider them together in
order to discern legislative intent.
139 Idaho at 154, 75 P.3d at 208: State v.
Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 632. 51 P.3d 443,
446 (Ct.App.2002). Even when a statute is
not ambiguous on its face, "judicial
construction might nevertheless be required
to harmonize the statute with other
legislative enactments on the same subject."
Winter v. State. 117 Idaho 103. 106, 785
P.2d 667. 670 (Ct.App.1989). We also are
obligated to apply the doctrine of lenity,
which requires courts to construe ambiguous
criminal statutes in favor of the accused.
State v. Wees, 138 Idaho 119. 124. 58 P.3d
103. 108 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Dewey,
131 Idaho 846. 848. 965 P.2d 206. 208
/Ct.App. 1998).

An analysis of the mental element (if any)
for vehicular manslaughter under
4006(3)(c) requires consideration of not
only the language of that statute, but also of
two additional statutes. One of those is the
excusable homicide statute, LC. 6 18-4012,
which provides:
Homicide is excusable in the following
cases:
1. When committed by accident and
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful
means, with usual and ordinary caution, and
without any unlawful intent.
2. When committed by accident and
misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any
sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a
sudden combat when no undue advantage is
taken nor any dangerous weapon used, and
when the killing is not done in a cruel or
unusual manner.
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operation of a motor vehicle:
(a) In the commission of an
unlawful act, not amounting to a
felony, with gross negligence; or,
(b) In the commission of a lawful
act which might produce death, in an
unlawful manner, and with gross
negligence; or,
(c) In the commission of an
unlawful act, not amounting to a
felony, without gross negligence; or,
(d) In the commission of a lawful
act which might produce death, in an
unlawful manner, but without gross
negligence.

The other is LC. 6 18-201(3), which
provides:All persons are capable of
committing crimes, except those belonging
to the following classes:

....
3. Persons who committed the act or made
the omission charged, through misfortune or
by accident, when it appears that there was
not evil design, intention or culpable
negligence.
In our view, 6 6 18-4012 and 18-201
collectively express a legislative intent that
there is no criminal homicide when a death
occurs through an accident and entirely
without any negligence or other culpable
behavior.
Although there are no previous Idaho
decisions directly addressing the issue
presented here, our interpretation of these
statutes draws some support fiom two prior
decisions, State v. Lona, 91 Idaho 436. 423
P.2d 858 (19672, and Haxforth v. State. 117
Idaho 189. 786 P.2d 580 (Ct.Avv.1990). In
Long, the defendant was charged with
involuntary manslaughter in the operation of
an automobile under then-existing
18-4006(2), which was very similar to the
18-4006(3).~ Long
present LC. 6
challenged
the
statute
as
being
unconstitutionally vague. In the course of
addressing that challenge, and ultimately
upholding the validity of the statute, the
supremecourt stated:

The legislature, classified the crime on the
basis of whether it was committed "with
gross negligence"-a felony, or "without
gross
negligence"-an
indictable
misdemean~r.~
Such distinction,
considered in harmony with the provisions
18-4012, indicates that the
of LC. 6
legislature intended that only a degree of
negligence (as that term is defined by
18-101. subv. 2) less than "gross
negligence," but of a degree which would
disclose acts, conduct, or omissions not
embraced within the excusable homicide
state, i.e., "when committed by accident and
misfortune in doing *267 **414 any lawful
act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary
would
constitute
a
caution,
misdemeanor.

..."

FN5. The same classification exists
under the present statutes. See LC.
4 18-4007(3_1.

FN4. The statute under consideration
in Long provided:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing
of a human being, without malice.
It is of two kinds:
1. Voluntary-....
2.
Involuntary-...;
or in the

Lona, 91 Idaho at 442,423 P.2d at 864.
In Hmforth, the defendant had attempted to
pass another vehicle, at a time when there
was traffic in the oncoming lane.
This
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maneuver, which violated I.C. 6 49-634,
caused the death of a passenger in an
oncoming vehicle.
The State charged
Haxforth with misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter, alleging not gross negligence
but ordinary negligence.
Following his
conviction, Haxforth brought a petition for
post-conviction relief, asserting, among
other things, that LC. 6 18-201 precluded
his conviction because even if he was
negligent, he was not "culpably negligent."
In rejecting that argument, this Court stated:
Idaho Code 6 18-201 states that a person is
incapable of committing a crime if he
"committed the act ... through misfortune or
by accident, when it appears that there was
not evil design, intention or culpable
negligence." (Emphasis added.) In Statev.
Long. 91 Idaho 436.443.423 P.2d 858, 865
(1967) our Supreme Court determined that
the reference to "culpable negligence" is
simply a reiteration of the excusable
homicide standard under I.C. 6 18-4012. It
does not preclude imposition of criminal
responsibility for negligence under the
vehicular manslaughter statute. In essence,
we understand Long to mean that negligence
in committing an unlawful act, resulting in
death, is "culpable negligence." Therefore,
we conclude that Haxforth is not shielded by
LC. 6 18-201.

Haxforth. 117 Idaho at 191. 786 P.2d at 582.
It is implicit in these comments that
commission of an act (even if it is unlawful
under a strict liability statute) that involves
no negligence at all would not satisfy the
"culpable negligence" requirement of
section 18-201 and therefore would not
support a conviction for vehicular
manslaughter.
The State incorrectly contends that the
above passage shows that the Haxforth
Court
"interpreted
any
negligence

requirement
in
the
misdemeanor
manslaughter statute to require nothing more
than an unlawful act resulting in death." To
the contrary, Haxforth says that, "negligence
in committing an unlawful act" is culpable
negligence. Id. (emphasis added).
Having concluded that Idaho law requires a
culpable mental state of at least simple
negligence before an individual may be
convicted of vehicular manslaughter, we
must determine whether the criminal
complaint and the jury instructions in
McNair's case adequately addressed this
element of the offense.
FN6. Because we conclude that LC.
-

6 6 18-201 and 18-4012 together
require a culpable mental state of at
least negligence, we need not address
McNair's argument that such a
requirement is mandated by the
constitutional guarantee of due
process.
B. The Criminal Complaint Was Not
Jurisdictionally Defective

McNair contends that the criminal
complaint was insufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court because it did not
allege that his failure to maintain his lane of
travel was the product of a negligent act or
omission and, hence, did not allege all of the
elements of vehicular manslaughter. The
State contends that because the charge was a
misdemeanor, it was not necessary to allege
the specific facts of the offense. Without
reaching the State's contention, we conclude
that the complaint was not jurisdictionally
defective.
The second amended complaint identified at
least three alternative unlawful acts which
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allegedly were committed by McNair and
caused the death of the victim: (1) driving
"carelessly, imprudently or inattentively"
andor (2) driving "at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the
conditions" and/or (3) "sliding his vehicle
into the oncoming northbound lane."
McNair does not challenge the sufficiency
of the allegations with respect to the first
two of these but contends that, because the
acts are pleaded in the alternative, the
omission of any allegation of negligence
with respect to the third act of sliding into
the oncoming lane makes the complaint
insufficient to allege an offense and, hence,
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
court.
**415 268r71181 A charging document will
be deemed so flawed that it fails to confer
jurisdiction on the court if the facts alleged
are not made criminal by statute or if the
document fails to state facts essential to
establish the offense charged. State v.
Maver, 139 Idaho 643, 646. 84 P.3d 579,
582 (Ct.App.2004); State v. Bvinpton. 135
Idaho 621. 21 P.3d 943 (Ct.A~a.2001). If
an alleged deficiency is raised by a
defendant before trial or entry of a guilty
plea, the charging document must state all
facts essential to establish the charged
offense, State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho
165, 168, 75 P.3d 219, 222 (Ct.A~~.2003);
Bvinpton. 135 Idaho at 623, 21 P.3d at 945;
but if the information is not challenged until
after a verdict or guilty plea, "it will be
liberally construed in favor of validity, and a
technical deficiency that does not prejudice
the defendant will not provide a basis to set
the conviction aside." Halbesleben. 139
Idaho at 168, 75 P.3d at 222; State v.
Cahoon. 116 Idaho 399,400,775 P.2d 1241,
1242 (1989); State v. Robran. 119 Idaho
285,287. 805 P.2d 491.493 (Ct.App.1991).
Thus, if the challenge is tardy, the charging

document will be upheld on appeal "unless
it is so defective that it does not, by any fair
or reasonable construction, charge an
offense for which the defendant was
convicted." Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 168.
75 P.3d at 222. See also Robran. 119 Idaho
at 287. 805 P.2d at 493.
Because the liberality we use in construing
the complaint depends upon the timing of
McNair's claim that it was jurisdictionally
defective, it is necessary to review the
relevant procedural history. The State's
original complaint was amended, and the
first amended complaint charged that on the
date in question McNair "did, unlawfully
but without malice kill Reed Elvin
Ostermeier, a human being, by operating a
motor vehicle ... in the commission of an
unlawful act or acts, not amounting to a
felony, without gross negligence, wherein,
his vehicle went into the oncoming lane of
traffic and struck the [Ostermeier]
vehicle...." Shortly afterward, McNair
moved to dismiss this amended complaint,
contending that the conduct alleged to have
constituted the underlying "unlawful act"
was consistent with lawful operation of a
motor vehicle. The State then filed the
second amended complaint that we have
heretofore quoted. The court minutes from
the hearing on the motion to dismiss show
that defense counsel told the court that he
was satisfied that the second amended
complaint resolved the objections raised in
the motion, and the magistrate therefore
found the motion to dismiss to be moot.
Now, following McNair's conviction, he
contends for the first time that the second
amended complaint was jurisdictionally
defective.
We therefore exercise
"considerable leeway to imply the necessary
allegations," Robran, 119 Idaho at 287. 805
P.2d at 493, and will find the pleading
insufficient to confer jurisdiction only if it
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does not "by any fair or reasonable
construction, charge the offense for which
the defendant was convicted." Halbesleben,
139 Idaho at 168, 75 P.3d at 222.
McNair points out that, "slidimg his vehicle
into the oncoming northbound lane" is
alleged as an independent, alternative
unlawful act upon which he could be
convicted for vehicular manslaughter. He
argues that because the phrase did not
include an allegation that he was negligent,
this alternate theory of criminal liability was
invalid, and that the entire complaint was
therefore insufficient to allege the offense.
Having concluded above that a culpable
mental state of at least negligence is
required under LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c), we
agree with McNair that the third alternative,
"and/or sliding his vehicle into the
oncoming northbound lane," was defective
for failure to allege any negligence or other
culpable mental state. It does not follow,
however, that the amended complaint is
jurisdictionally insufficient merely because
the third alternative is infirm. Both the first
and second alternatives made clear
references to negligence, by using such
words and phrases as, "carelessly,"
"imprudently," "inattentively," "not paying
attention," and "at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the
FN7
McNair does not
conditions." challenge"269 **416 the sufficiency of the
first and second alternatives. Because the
first two alternatives were sufficient to
describe an offense, we conclude that the
second amended complaint as a whole was
adequate to confer jurisdiction on the court.
FN7.
-

The first alternative was
apparently referring to inattentive
driving, I.C. 6 49-1401(3), as the

underlying unlawful act and the
second alternative was apparently
referring to a violation of Idaho's
basic speed rule, LC. 6 49-654(1).
C. Jury Instructions

Y
JJ We next address McNair's contention
that the jury instructions were erroneous
because they did not require a finding that
McNair was negligent before he could be
found guilty of vehicular manslaughter
under LC. 6 18-4006(3)(c).

J 101r 1111121

When
reviewing jury
instructions, we ask whether the instructions
as a whole, and not individually, fairly and
accurately reflect applicable law. State v.
Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 743. 69 P.3d 153,
163 (Ct.Avv.2003); State v. Bowman. 124
Idaho 936, 942. 866 P.2d 193. 199
JCt.A~~.1993). A trial court must charge
the jury with all rules of law material to the
determination of the defendant's milt or
innocence. LC. 6 19-2132(a); State v.
Fetterlv. 126 Idaho 475. 476. 886 P.2d 780,
781 (Ct.Apa. 1994). Therefore, the jury
must be instructed on all elements of the
charged offense. Halbesleben. 139 Idaho at
168-69. 75 P.3d at 222-23; State v. Crowe,
135 Idaho 43, 47. 13 P.3d 1256, 1260
fCt.Avv.2000). The omission of an element
of the crime impermissibly lightens the
prosecution's burden of proof. Id.

-

McNair contends that Instruction 3 required
the jury to convict him even if it found that
he was not negligent during the events
leading up to the collision. That instruction
said:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of
Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must
prove each of the following:
1. On or about February 9,2001
2. in the state of Idaho
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3. the defendant Hugh S. NcNair, while
operating a motor vehicle committed one or
more of the following acts;
(a) Inattentive driving; and/or
(b) Operating his motor vehicle in violation
of Idaho's Basis Rule; and/or
(c) Failing to maintain lane of travel.
4. the defendant's operation of the motor
vehicle in an unlawful manner caused the
death of Reed Ostermeier:
You are further instructed that the unlawful
act or acts are committed when one or all of
the following occurred:
(a) The defendant drove his vehicle
inattentively, carelessly or imprudently, in
light of the circumstances then existing;
and/or
(b) The defendant drove his motor vehicle in
violation of Idaho's Basic Rule by driving at
a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards
then existing or by failing to drive at a safe
and appropriate speed when approaching
and going around a curve or by reason of
weather or highway conditions; and/or
(c) The defendant, while driving his motor
vehicle, failed to maintain his lane of travel.
If the state has failed to prove paragraphs 1
through 4, then you must find the defendant
not guilty. If you unanimously find that the
state has proven paragraphs 1 through 4,
including at least one of the components of
the unlawful act or acts as stated in 3(a) or
(b) or (c) beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant guilty of
vehicular manslaughter.
This instruction, argues McNair, directed the
jury to convict him based solely upon his
failure to maintain his lane of travel, even if
such failure was not a product of negligence.
We agree. Application of parts 3(c) and
4(c) of the instruction required the jury to
find McNair guilty if the collision was

caused by McNair's failure to maintain his
lane of travel, irrespective of negligence or
other fault.
The State contends that any deficiency in
Instruction 3 was cured by Instruction 3A,
which was based upon LC. 6 18-201(31, and
which stated:
All persons are capable of committing
crimes, except those belonging to the
following classes:

....

""417 "270 3. Persons who committed the
act or made the omission charged, through
misfortune or by accident, when it appears
that there was not evil design, intention or
culpable negligence.
We are not persuaded that this instruction
cured the flaw in Instruction 3. The two
instructions may well have led to jury
confusion because they contradicted one
another. Instruction 3 told the jurors that if
they found McNair caused the victim's death
by failing to maintain his lane of travel
while driving, they "must fmd the defendant
guilty
of
vehicular
manslaughter."
Instruction 3A, on the other hand, implied
that McNair would not be guilty if he was
not negligent. A juror who believed the
defense theory, that McNair's vehicle left the
lane of travel but that it was not due to any
negligence on McNair's part, would be hardpressed to determine what effect to give to
Instruction 3A when Instruction 3 required a
guilty verdict.

1131 The instructions did not preclude the
jury from finding McNair guilty without any
finding of negligence or other culpability.
When it is not possible to determine whether
the jury reached its verdict on a correct or
incorrect legal theory, an appellate court
must vacate the conviction and remand the
case for a new trial. State v. Luke. 134
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Idaho 294,301, 1 P.3d 795,802 (2000).

CONCLUSION
The second amended complaint in this case
was sufficient to allege an offense on two of
the three legal theories alleged, and it
therefore was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court. However, the jury
instructions were deficient because they did
not require the State to prove a culpable
mental state amounting to at least simple
negligence.
Therefore, the judgment of
conviction is vacated and the case remanded
for a new trial.
Judge G U T I E m Z and Judge Pro Tem
BEVAN concur.
Idaho App.,2005.
State v. McNair
141 Idaho 263,108 P.3d 410
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
SRANE MCKAY,
Petitioner,
VS.

)

1
1
1
)

1
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1
1

1

CASE NO. CV07-728C
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

ORIGINAL

On January 19,2007, Shane McKay filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief,
motion for permission to conduct discovery and request that the Court take judicial notice of the
underlying criminal record. On January 22, Mr. McKay filed a memorandum in support of his
petition. Mr. McKayalleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel as a result of
Attorney Richard Hanis's failure to object to jury instructions that omitted the elements of cause
and intent, which were at issue in his trial. Mr. McKay further contended that he received

1 MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to Attorney Jason Pintler's failure to raise the jury
instn~ctionerror as an issue on appeal.
The state filed an answer, motion for summary dismissal and objection to discovery.
Although the state concedes that the Court's instruction to the vehicular manslaughter jury
instruction deviated from the pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (ICJI), it asserts that the
deviation benefitted Mr. McKay. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. McKay asks the Court to
deny the state's motion for summary dismissal and, instead, summarily grant Mr. McKay's
petition for post-conviction relief.

B.

Argument

1dahb Code 5 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction
relief, pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Summary dismissal is
permissible only when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact,
which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Downing v. State, 136
Idaho 367,371, 33 P.3d 841, 845 (Ct. App. 2001). If such a factual issue is presented, an
evidentiaiy hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763, 819 P.2d 1159,
1163 (Ct. App. 1991).
Mr. McKay has alleged that Attorney Harris failed to object to jury instructions that
omitted the elements of intent and cause and that, because those elements were at issue, the
jury's finding of guilt was not surely unattributable to the error. These facts, if resolved in Mr.
McMay's favor, establish that trial counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable manner and
that Mr. McKay was prejudiced by that performance.
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Moreover, the jury instructions given in this case materially deviated from the pattem
ICJI approved by the Idaho Supreme Court and were improper as a matter of law. The trial
transcript' establishes that the elements of cause and intent were at issue and, thus, there could be
no strategic purpose for trial counsel's decislon to inform the Court he did not intend to request
jury instn~ctionsaddressing each element of the offense. Accordingly, Mr. McKay is entitled to
summary disposition of his petition and the Court's order granting him relief.
1. The state is not entitled to summary dismissal

The state contends that it is entitled to summary dismissal because the "Court's
instruction required the state to prove that the defendant's conduct was THE CAUSE of the death
of Ted Cox," which benefitted Mr. McKay by placing a higher burden on the state than the
pattem instruction. State's Motion p.2 (emphasis in original). However, a close reading of the
Court's instruction establishes that it required the state to prove that Mr. McKay's "operation of
the motor vehicle caused the death of Ted Cox." Instruction 201A, Exhibit 2 to Dennis
Benjamin's Affidavit. Contrary to the state's assertion, this instruction neither required the jury
to conclude that Mr. McKay's conduct was the only cause of the death nor that his conduct was a
significant cause as required by law. Rather, the instruction permitted the jury to find Mr.
McKay guilty based on its conclusion that Mr. McKay's conduct contributed to the death.
Moreover, as argued in Mr. McKay's memorandum in support of his post-conviction
petition, the Court materially deviated from the ICJI by failing to clarify that Mr. McKay's

'

.

.

On Januarv 19.2007.
Mr. McKav reauested that the Court take iudicial notice of the
,
underlying criminal proceedings. See Attached Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin. For the
criminal
convenience of Court and counsel, Mr. McKav has attached vortions of the underlving
,
proceedings as exhibits to Mr. Benjamin's affidavit.
A

w
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ilnlawful operation of his vehicle caused the death. Pursuant to the pattern ilistr~~ction
approved
by the Idaho Supreme Court, a defendant is guilty if the state proves he committed an unlawful
act by driving while under the influence of alcohol and "the defendant's operation of the motor
vehicle it2 such z~rzlnwft,lnznnner was a signlficnnt cause contributing to the death." ICJI 703
(emphasis added). The Court's instruction in this case omitted the phrase "in such unlawful
manner" and the word "significant." Thus, the jury was permitted to find Mr. McKay guilty if it
concluded that he committed an unlawful act while operating a vehicle and the operation of the
vehicle caused a death, regardless of whether it was the unlawful operation of the vehicle that
caused the death.
Additionally, the trial transcript demonstrates that the elements of cause and intent were
at issue. The deceased's blood alcohol level was .19. Exhibit 3 to Dennis Benjamin's Affidavit,
p. 556,l. 18-23. There was evidence suggesting the motorcycle ridden by the deceased did not
have an operational taillight at the time of the collision and was either stopped or traveling at a
very stow speed. See Exhibit 3 to Dennis Benjamin's Affidavit, p. 629,l. 1 l top. 632, L. 23; p.
660,l. 1I to p. 664,I. 15; p. 704 to p. 16. During a jury instruction conference, Attorney Harris
indicatedthat the element of cause presented a dilemma in the case but that he did not intend to
request a jury instruction on cause. Exhibit 1 to Dennis Benjamin's Affidavit, p. 14-15,], 25-4.
It was objectively unreasonable to acknowledge that the element of cause was an issue in the case
and then fail to object to the jury instructions that removed an essential element from the jury's
consideration.
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By failing to instruct that Mr. McKay's urzlawful operation of the vehicle was a
signnificntzt cause of the death, the Court's instruction relieved the state of its burden to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. McKay's unlawful conduct was the legal cause of the death.
Although contributory negligence is not a defense to vehicular manslaughter, the deceased's
conduct is relevant to whether the defendant's culpable conduct was the proximate cause of the
death. Miller v. State, 513 S.E.2d 27,30-31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). A lnotorist cannot yield to
what he cannot see. State v. Brown, 603 N.W.2d 456,461 (Neb. 1999). In Miller, the defendant
struck a bicycle with his vehicle and an analysis of his blood revealed a BAC of .17. The trial
court's re-instruction to the jury was reversible error because it could have lefl the jury with the
mistaken notion that a defendant's intoxicated driving need only be a cause or an indirect cause
of the death and could have deprived the defendant of his defense that, even if driving under the
influence, that conduct was not the proximate cause of the death. Miller, 5 13 S.E.2d at 32.
Similarly, here, if the deceased's motorcycle was stopped or nearly stopped in the middle
of the road during the night without a taillight, Mr. McKay could not have seen him regardless of
whether he was driving under the influence. However, the jury instruction in this case allowed
the jury to find him guilty if it concluded that he committed a DUI and the operation of his
vehicle was a cause contributing to the death.
The state contends that, because Attorney Harris argued in closing that the element of
cause had not been established, the jury instruction deviation from the pattern instructions did not
harm Mr. McKay. However, Attorney Hams's closing argument reiterates that cause was at
issue in the trial and that Mr. McKay was prejudiced by the erroneous jury instruction.
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Moreover, the state's argument fails to take into account this Court's instruction to the jury
which stated:
You must follow all the rules as I explcrin them to you. You may not follow some
and ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some
of the ntles, you are bound to follow them. Ifanyone states a rule or law w e r e n t
from any I tell you, it is my instrnction that you must follow.
Jury Instruction No. 201 (Emphasis added); Exhibit 2 to Dennis Benjamin's Affidavit.
The state asserts as an affirmative defense that the jury instruction issue could have been
raised on direct appeal and that Mr. McKay is therefore precluded from addressing the issue in
post-conviction. However, as argued in Mr. McKay's memorandum in support of his petition,
the Idaho Court of Appeals held in State v. Anderson, -Idaho

,

P.3d

(Ct. App.

2006), 2006 WL 2974049, review grunted (Jan. 18,2007), that a non-preserved jury instruction
cannot be raised on appeal even where the instruction constituted fundamental error. Therefore,
Attorney Hams's deficient performance further prejudiced Mr. McKay by denying him the
opportunity to have the jury instruction reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
Alternatively, if Anderson is overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court on review, Mr.
McKay's evidence demonstrates that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The
jury instructions in this case relieved the state from its burden to prove every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt and, thus, violated Mr. McKay's right to due process of law.
The error therefore rose to the level of fundamental error and could have been raised for the first
time on appeal. "In the case of ftmdamental error in a criminal case the Supreme Court may
consider the same even though no objection had been made at the time of trial." See e.g., State v.
Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,251,486 P. 2d 260,262 (1971).

6 MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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The evidence submitted by Mr. McKay demonstrates that he received ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Accordingly, the Court should deny the state's motion
for sulnmaly dismissal.
2.

Mr. McKav is entitled to summary disposition

The Court's instruction on the element of cause varied from ICJI 703 by omitting the
phrase "in such unlawful manner" and the word "significant." By deviating from the pattern
instructions approved by the Idaho Supreme Court, the Court took considerable risk that the
verdict finding Mr. McKay guilty would be overturned on appeal. See State v. Merwin, 131
Idaho 642,647, 962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). Nevertheless, Attorney Harris failed to object to
the Court's erroneous instn~ctionand Attorney Pintler failed to address the error on direct appeal
Counsels' respective performance was objectively unreasonable and constitutionally deficient as

a matter of law.
Additionally, the trial transcript establishes that there was evidence, which could
rationally lead to a finding in Mr. McKay's favor with respect to the element of cause.
Therefore, the record in this case establishes that Mr. McKay received ineffective assistance of
trial and appellate counsel. This Court should summarily grant Mr. McKay's petition for postconviction relief.
C.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. McKay asks the Court to deny the state's motion for
summary dismissal and to grant his motion for summary disposition.

7 MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Respeciiitily submitted t h i s 2 day of March, 2007,
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Attorney for Shane McKay
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on t h i eb-cl
day of March 2007,I caused a true aid correct
copy of the foregoing document to be:
mailed
__ faxed

hand delivered
to:

Gearld L. Wolff
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1 1 15 Albany
Caldwell, ID 83605
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L

DAVID L. YOUNG
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1 115 Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

.

M

.

MAW 2 8 2007
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
B RAYNE, DEPUTY

Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

SHANE MCKAY,

1
)

DefendanVPetitioner,

j

CASENO. CV0700728

NOTICE OF FILING

VS.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, who gives the Court
and Petitioner notice of the filing of two documentary exhibits to refute Petitioner's allegations of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in Petitioner's Cross Motion for Summary Disposition.
Said documents are certified copies from Supreme Court file number 3 1652, State v. Shane McKav,
admissible under I.R.E. 803(8), 901,902, 1001, 1003 and 1005. The documents are:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and
Statement in Support Thereof filed on April 3, 2006 by appellate counsel, Jason
Pintler - Exhibit "A", and

NOTICE OF FILING
OF EXHIBITS - 1

H:\MOTION.ORD\mckay notfiling.wpd

P.M.

2.

The Order Granting Motion to Augment and lo Suspend the Briefing Schedule,
Exhibit " B .

DATED ~hig-y

of March, 2007.

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Notice of Hearing was personally
delivered to the Defendant's attornev of record hv
-,
mailing said copy to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. B
2772, Boise, Idaho 83701, on or about the*
of March, 2007.

NOTICE OF FILING
OF EXHIBITS -2
H:\MOTION.ORD\rnckay notfiling.wpd

,.
8

'

.
2

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of ldaho
I.S.B. # 4843

,

.- b1 ORIGINAL

-.
,_
.f ,-.:,7..:.:.L,ci',y?
. . : .:E,:
<Oi,!RT
. .C

I

,.

, .:>

SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 6661
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ldaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SHANE MC KAY,
Defendant-Appellant.

1
)

I
j

1
)
)

CASE NO. 31652

MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO
SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE
AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF

COMES NOW, defendant-appellant Shane McKay, through Jason C. Pintler,
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, and moves this Court pursuant to ldaho
Appellate Rule 30, for an order augmenting the record in the above-entitled appeal with
a copy of the following documents:

2 ) Instructions to the Jury (copy file-stamped Oct. 29, 2004, attached);
2) Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions (copy file-stamped Oct. 22, 2004,
attached);
3) Transcript of the opening arguments of counsel which occurred on Oct. 25,
2004, (a copy of which is not attached as it has not yet been prepared);
4) Transcript of the conference on jury instructions which occurred on Oct. 29,
2004, (a copy of which is not attached as it has not yet been prepared); and
MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEF&@fjf$$g?
1
Fvhihit

5) Transcript of the closing arguments of counsel which occurred on Oct. 29,
2004. (a copy of which is not attached as it has not yet been prepared).
The appellant requests that the record be augmented to include the above
named items because they are necessary to address issues to be raised on appeal. It
appears that the district court's jury instruction 201A, the instruction giving the elements
that the jury must find in order to find Mr. McKay guilty of vehicular manslaughter, are a
misstatement of the law. Mr. McKay intends to raise as an issue on appeal the question
of whether his right to due process was violated by the district court's jury instruction. In
order to properly address this issue, it is necessary that this record include the jury
instructions as given. In addition, in order to determine whether or not any claimed error
was invited on the part of Mr. McKay, it is necessary for this Court to review his
proposed jury instructions and the transcript of the jury instruction conference.
Furthermore, in order to determine the extent to which the possible misstatement of the
law affected Mr. McKay's right to a fair trial, it is necessary to review the opening and
closing arguments of counsel.
"It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error,

...and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed
to support the actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34, 981 P.2d
754, 759 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). The requested items are currently missing
from the record on appeal. Unless made part of the record, they will be presumed to
support the district court's conclusion that the jury instructions given were appropriate.
In order to overcome this presumption. Shane McKay requests that the requested items
be made part of the record on appeal.
Additionally, Shane McKay moves this Court pursuant to I.A.R. 32(c), for an
order suspending the briefing schedule in the above-entitled appeal until copies of the
above requested transcripts are made a part of'the record on appeal. Appellate counsel
MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THERE060@t?&

is currently unable to properly review the merits of the case or write a brief on the merits
without the ability to first review the requested items. Accordingly, counsel requests that
briefing be suspended pending the Court and counsel's receipt of the requested
transcripts. Thereafter, counsel can review the items and complete the brief.
Appellant further requests that the district court clerk forward proper copies of the
requested items to the State Appellate Public Defender and the Idaho Attorney
General's Office.
This motion is not filed to delay the appellate process and is made in good faith.
It is the belief of the movant that a temporary suspension of the appellate process will
ultimately expedite this case.
Counsel for the respondent has not been contacted in regard to the instant
motion.
DATED this 3rdday of April, 2006.

JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of April, 2006, caused a true and
correct copy of the attached MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE
BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF to be hand
delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court for:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
DEPUTYAlTORNEYGENERAL
-. - . . . .
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE. ID 83720-0010
-

G
?
*
/X

EVAN A. SMITH
Legal Secretary
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STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO AUGMENT AND TO
SUSPEND THE BRIEFING
SCHEDULE

1

S H A M MC KAY,

NO. 31652
Defendant-Appellant.
I//

,!>

A MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND

11%

!jl

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF with attachments was filed by counsel for Appellant on
April 3,2006; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the
transcripts listed below with the District Court Clerk within twenty-eight (28) days from the date
of this Order, and the District Court Clerk shall immediately serve counsel and file the transcripts
with this Court. Any corrections shall be filed with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30.1:
1. Transcript of the opening arguments of counsel held on October 25,2004.
2. Transcript of the conference on jury instructions held on October 29,2004.

1
I/:;I

~ii

/I'

11
r.j
,il

i~i

3. Transcript of the closing arguments of counsel held on October 29,2004.

/i;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appeal record shall include the documents listed

I

below, copies of which were submitted with the Motion, as EXHIBITS:

I

1

jjj
t.,

/!

1. Instructions to the Jury, copy file-stamped October 29,2004

I"

111

:I!

il:

2. Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions, copy file-stamped October 22,2004.

iii'I!

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO SUSPEND THE

/!i

!I/
i!,

BRIEFING SCHEDULE be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and the proceedings in this appeal are

j,.!//l:

!I

!ii
,'>

,,,
1:;

;i//I

A

SUSPENDED until the transcripts listed above are filed with this Court, at which time the due
date for filing Appellant's Brief shall be reset which shall be thirty-five (35) days thereafter.

11;
.I:
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'I

11;

i(/

*I!

t,:

c.
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Exhibit
iii
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.<$>*

i' =-111
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--DATED this&

!I

For the Supreme Court

cc: Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter

I
1

I

day of April, 2006.

-&
jb
&wT
k.
Stephen

Kenyon, Clerk

I, Stephen W. Kenyon. Clerk d thB Supreme Cwrt.

cefiqcFrth

do hereby
above !sa true and correct copy of t h e & o ~ " n d ~
entered ~n the a W entitled c
ow and IWW on
record in my onm.
3/25/07
WITNESS my hand and the Seal d tMs Court-

of the State of ldahb,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: REANE J. HOFF

1

SHANE MCKAY,
Petitioner,

DATE: May 21,2007
COURT MINUTE
CASE NO: CV2007-728°C

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

1

Respondent

TIME: 3:30 P.M.
REPORTED BY: Carole Waiden
DCRT3 (4:'lO-5:OO)

)

This having been the time heretofore set for motion for summary disposition
and motion for summary judgment in the above entitled matter, the petitioner was not
personally present in court, but was represented by counsel, Mr. Dennis Benjamin and
the State was represented by counsel Mr. Gearld L. Wolff, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
for Canyon County.
The Court reviewed prior proceedings, noted the State's motion for summary
disposition, the petitioner's motion for summary judgment and instructed the State to
proceed with oral argument.
Mr. Woiff presented argument to the Court in support of the motion for summary
disposition.

COURT MINUTES
May 21,2007

Page 1
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Mr. Benjamin responded with argument, requested the Court grant summary
disposition as to the petition and deny the motion on behalf of the State.
Mr. Wolff responded with further argument.
Mr. Benjamin concluded with further argument.
The Court announced Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court
found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, the Petition only raised a
question of law, therefore, summary disposition is appropriate. The Court found no
error in the failure of Mr. Harris to object to the instruction and if there was an error it
was to the benefit of the defendant, so it could not be said on the narrow issue that
counsel was ineffective. The Court denied the petition for post conviction relief and
granted the State's motion for summary dismissal.

The Court instructed the State to prepare an order denying post conviction and
granting summary dismissal and the Court would hold the same for five (5) days for any
objection to the verbiage. The Court further instructed the Court Reporter to prepare a
transcript of the proceedings for appeal purposes.

- b'/& Uhl C L
!3eputa/ Clerk

COURT MINUTES
May 21,2007

Page 2
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

JUN O 1 2007
CANYON COUNTY CLERK

% ""

Attorneys for the Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE MCKAY,
No. CV-0700728
'Petitioner,
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

ORIGINAL

Shane McKay asks this Court for an Order Granting Relief from Judgment. This motion
is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) because there has been an unintentional misrepresentation
of fact by an adverse party.
During the motion hearing on May 21,2007, the Respondent represented to the Court that
the analysis of Ted Cox's blood had been misinterpreted at the time of the criminal trial and that
his blood alcohol concentration was actually .OO and not .19 as previously believed. That,
however, is not the case. In fact, the ".I9 RESULT" noted on the Mercy Medical Center
Laboratory Report could mean either .19 milligrams per deciliter of blood was found in Mr.
Cox's blood (in which case the BAC would be .00) or it could mean that .19 grams per deciliter

1 * PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

of blood was found (in which case the BAC would be .19). Further, during the deposition of Dr.
Thomas M. Donndelinger, M.D., the Director of Laboratory at Mercy Medical Center, taken in
the case of Sorensen and Cox v. McKay, et al., Canyon Co. CV-04-10959, he stated that he had
spoken to Kathy Higgins, the technician who performed the blood test and the one who made the
".I9 RESULT" notation on the lab report. Ms. Higgins told Dr. Donndelinger that the .19 result
meant .19% blood alcohol concentration, not .00. Deposition of Thomas M. Donndelinger, pg.
34, in. 14 - pg. 35, in. 14.

A true and correct c o.w. of Dr. Donndelinger's
deposition is attached as Exhibit A hereto.
Respectfully submitted this

s r
3
L
day of May 2007.

Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Petitioner

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on M a d Z O O 7 , I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be
mailed

-hand delivered

-faxed
to:

Gearld L. Wolff
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany
Caldwell. ID 83605

kt%
Dennis Benjamin
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAZ, DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
MARY KATHRYN SORENSEN and
PATRICIA COX,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

\

vs .

I

SHANE EDWARD McKAY,
DAVID McKAY and VIVIAN McKAY,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 04-10959

Defendants.
)

DEPOSITION .OF THOMAS M: DONNDELINGER

November 7, 2006
Nampa, Idaho

Reported By:

Andrea I,. Chandler, RPR
,

'

,

copy
..

.

-...-. .

0002.96

. .......

1618 W. Jefferson y Boise Idaho r 83702
(800) 588-3370 r (208) 343-4004 r (208) 343-4002 Fax

.,

. ......... .

EXHIBIT

DEPOSITION OF THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER

BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of
THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER was taken by the Defendants at
Mercy Medical Center, located at 1512 12th Avenue Road,
Nampa, Idaho, before Associated Reporting, Inc.,

I

Andrea L. Chandler, Court Reporter and Notary Public in
and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, on Tuesday,
the 7th day of November, 2006, commencing at the hour of
1:15 p.m. in the above-entitled matter.

APPEARANCES :

For the Plaintiffs: YTURRI ROSE
By: Timothy J. Helfrich, Esq.
Post Office Box 450
Fruitland, Idaho 83619
Telephone: (208) 452-3209
Facsimile: (541) 889-2432
thelfrich@yturrirose.com
For the Defendants:

TOLMAN, BRIZEE & MARTENS
By: Jennifer Kauth Brizee, Esq
132 3rd Avenue East
Post Office Box 1276
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276
Telephone: (208) 733-5566
Facsimile: (208) 733-5444
jbrizee@tolrnanlaw. com

I

I N D E X

E X A M I N A T I O N
THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER
By:

Ms.

PAGE

Brizee

Mr. Helfrich

1.

Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum
of Thomas M. Donndelinger (3 pages)

4

2.

Mercy Medical Center Lab Specimen Internal
Inquiry Dated 8/30/06 (2 pages)

4

3.

Mercy Medical Center Doctor Report
(1 page)

4.

Mercy Medical Center Doctor Report
(1 page)

5.

Letter from Thomas M. Donndelinger
to Ms. Brizee (1 page)

6.

Letter from Amelia Rennaux Dated 10/31/06
(1 page)

4

7.

Mercy Medical Center Lab Specimen Internal
Inquiry Dated 11/07/06 (2 pages)

4

November 7,2006

Thomas M. Donndelinger
' 1'

2
3

.

,

I just like to mark these and show these to
2 people to make sure they have an understanding that the
3 notice of deposition was duces tecum, which means to
4 bring all documents -5
A. Yes.
6
Q. --with them.
7
A. Yes.
8
Q. And have you brought with you today all
9 documentation relative to this October 5, 2003 blood
1 0 draw on Ted Cox?
11
A. That's correct.
12
Q. Let me ask you before we get into the
1 3 documents, so that I can have an understanding of what
1 4 we're talking about once we get there: Can you walk me
1 5 through what happens when a blood specimen comes to your
1 6 lab for an alcohol evaluation?
17
Just walk me through the steps of what
1 8 happens.
19
A. Okay. The blood specimen is obtained from the
20 individual. The individual is identified on a label on
2 1 the tube. There are requests that are generated into
22 finding what laboratory tests are to be done on the
2 3 sample. And from that accession, it goes into the
24 appropriate department in the laboratory, in this case,
2 5 chemistry.
1

PROCEEDINGS

(Deposition Exhibit Nos. 1 through 7

4
were marked for identification.)
5
6
THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER,
7 a witness having been first duly sworn to tell the
8 truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, was
9 examined and testified as follows:

10
11

EXAMJNATION
1 2 BY MS. BRIZEE:
Q. Doctor, would you please state your full name
13
1 4 and your business address for our record.
15
A. Thomas M. Donndelinger,
1 6 D-0-N-N-D-E-L-I-N-G-E-R, 1512 12th Avenue Road, Nampa,
1 7 Idaho 83686.
15
MS. BRIZEE: And, Counsel, can we have the same
1 9 stipuiation,that this deposition is taken pursuant to
20 proper notice, and that it will be taken in accordance
2 1 with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure?
MR. HELFRICH: Yes.
22
Q. (BY MS. BRIZEE) Dr. Donndelinger, what is
23
24 your official title here at Mercy Medical Center?
A. Director of Laboratory.
25
Page 4

1
2
3
4

Page 6

Q. And how long have you been here?
A. Since 1973.
Q. How long have you been the director?
A. Intermittently most of the time. But it gets

6 here, Dr. Druler.
7
Q. So for how long -- you're the medical director
8 right now; correct?
So the specimen comes to the lab, and it's

0 individual drawing the tube.

As far as the Ted Cox blood specimen, do we

1 (Pages 4 t-o 7 )
Associated Reporting, Inc
208.343.4004

'.

,

.
SorensenICox v. McKay

November 7,2006

Thomas M. Donndelinger

1 it bedn discarded?
2
A. We no longer have any of the specimen left,
3 and after the storage cycle, it's discarded -4 incinerated.
Q. (BY MS. BRIZEE) So there is some period for
5
6 which these specimens are stored, is what you're saying,
7 and then they are incinerated?
8
A. Yes.
9
Q. For what period are these specimens typically
1 0 stored?
11
A. I'd have to re-check. It's in the range of a
1 2 week.
Q. So it's not something that's stored for
13
1 4 months?
A. No.
15
16
Q. I'm assuming if somebody requests that you
1 7 store it longer, you have that capability?
18
A. Yes.
Q. Have we looked to see if we have any of this
19
2 0 specimen still stored with us?
A. Yes.
21
Q. And we do not?
22
23
A. No.
24
Q. When the specimen comes in, you said there are
2 5 some requests that are generated, and those requests
Page 8

1 and I'm going to hand you what's been marked as Exhibit

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

4.
Just to clarify, because there is, I believe,
an indication in our record that -- from the coroner's
report that both urine and blood were drawn on Mr. Cox.
And I'd like to know -- you're going to have to educate
me here -- what number is this, Doctor? Number 3.
A. 3 and4.
Q. Is 3 an analysis of blood or urine or both?
A. It's an analysis of urine.
Q. But the analysis of the urine did not include
any kind of alcohol analysis; correct?
A. That's correct.
MR. HELFRICH: Excuse me, Counsel, could I see 3?
MS. BRIZEE: Sure.
MR. HELFRICH: Thanks.
Q. (BY MS. BRIZEE) Let's go back to 3 forjust a
second, and then we can he done with it.
Is there any indication on 3 that Mr. Cox had
any drugs or medication in his urine?
A. No, there's not.
Q. So let's just talk from here on out on the
blood specimen. I just wanted to clarify that there
were two specimens, but we're really here to talk about
the blood specimen.
Page 1 0

1
So the blood specimen would go to chemistry?
2
A. That's correct.
Q. And then it would be centrifuged. And the
3
4 purpose of centrifuging is to separate the serum?
usually a physician, and what tests are they requesting.
A. From the cells.
5
Q. Have we looked for an order sheet on this
Q. From the cells. Okay.
6
particular specimen?
7
So in centrifuging the serum is separated, and
A. No - I mean, yes. We no longer have records
8 then I believe you said a designated amount is put into
that go back that far.
9 the automated analyzer?
Q. Okay. Does the specimen get logged in any
A. Yes.
10
kind of a log book?
11
Q. And who designates the amount, or is that
A. With a written record, no. These are all
1 2 really an issue here at all?
entered in the laboratory computer or information
A. It's not. The amount isn't an issue. The
13
system.
1
4
actual
measurement of what volume is being analyzed is
Q. Then you said -- I believe you said after the
1 5 handled automatically by theinstrument. You have to
accession -- is that the same as after receipt?
1 6 load a reservoir in the instrument with the patient's
A. Yes.
1 7 name or number identification. So a supply of the
Q. -- the specimen is given to the appropriate
1 8 patient's serum sample is put into the --into the
department for analysis, which I'm assuming depends on
1 9 instrument.
what tests have been ordered; is that correct?
Q. And the instrument being the automated
2
0
A. That's correct.
2 1 analyzer?
Q. And in this case, for a blood alcohol
A. Yes.
22
analysis, it would go to chemistry?
Q. Are all automated analyzers the same, or is
23
A. Right.
2
4
that
the brand name? I mean
Q. In this case -- Dr. Donndelinger, I'm going to
2
5
A.
No. There are different vendors for automated
hand you what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 3,
Page 11
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1 would be what testing is being requested on the

2 specimen?
3
A. From the ordering end. Who is ordering it,
4

5
6

7
8
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1
A. It prints out, and then the results also get
2 transferred to the data storage part of the laboratory
3 computer -- laboratory information system.

Q. Do you have the same analyzer today in use in
your lab that you would have in October of '03?
A. Yes.
Q. What kind of analyzer is it?
A. I'd have to re-check the vendor's name.
Q. Okay. Let me ask you this question: Does
this lab -- I'm assuming this lab does analyze blood for
blood alcohol levels, other than for the county coroner?
A. Yes.
Q. In what other instances or context does this
lab analyze blood for blood alcohol levels?
A. Most of those requests come from the emergency
room physicians.
Q. But a blood specimen from the county coroner
would undergo the same process as a blood specimen for
the ER for blood alcohol analysis; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Let's go back to the process. So
the serum is separated, a designated amount is put into
the automated analyzer equipment -- and I guess when
we're done, maybe we can have you get the name of
that -A. I can get the name.
Q. --for us.
Page 12

4
Q. So once you have printed out the results, does
5 that mean it's no longer on that particular computer
6 that's attached to the automated analyzer? Are the
7 results stored on that system?
8
A. No. The results are transferred to the
9 laboratory information system, and they are stored there
1 0 in accessible and archival form.
11
Q. In this particular instance related to
1 2 Ted Cox's -- the analysis of Ted Cox's blood for a blood
1 3 alcohol level -- and I'm going to hand you what's -1 4 well, let's go -- I was going to hand you Deposition
1 5 Exhibit No. 2,but I think your Deposition Exhibit No. 7
1 6 is more accurate.
17
Actually, before we go there. When a coroner
1 8 -- when the county coroner brings you a specimen, is
1 9 Exhibit 4 then what is provided to the county coroner?
20
A. Yes.
Q. However, you have -- and what is that called?
21
22 What do you call that in the lab, Exhibit 4?
23
A. Laboratory report.
Q. What is the difference behveen --is there a
24
2 5 different name for No. 7 then -- what's been marked as
Page 1

And then you indicated there is a menu to
select which test is to be performed; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, we've never worked in a lab before, but
are there different blood alcohol level tests you can
choose, or are you choosing to have a blood alcohol test
performed?
A. Choosing a blood alcohol test as a category of
analysis, as opposed to a number of different chemical
determinations that can be performed.
Q. And then the analyzer -- and then the
equipment mns the test; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And then -- and I have a vision that the blood
specimen is actually in the machine when it's being
tested; is that accurate?
A. That's correct.
Q. And then the equipment actually displays the
results on a screen. Does that mean a computer screen?
A. Computer screen.
Q. Is the colnputer part of the automated
analyzer?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you press a button, and it prints
out?
Page 13

1 Deposition Exhibit No. 7, which is what you produced to
2 us today; correct?
3
A. That's correct.
4
Q. And here's what I'm getting at: We've had
5 Exhibit 4 from one source or another for some period of
6 time. Exhibit No. 7 is a fairly new document that we
7 have not had -- well, this one in particular have not
8 had, but for just a few minutes, since you gave it to
9 us.
10
But Mr.Helfiich's version we've not had. Is
11 this something -- it looks different. What do you call
12 this document?
13
A. Well, this document is the laboratory report
1 4 on Ted Cox retrieved out of archive in the laboratory
1 5 infonnation system. I believe the other one is a copy
1 6 of the report, probably, the coroner's office has.
17
I don't -- I don't know where -- you know,
18 offhand, I don't know where you've got that. But in
1 9 terms of formatting, when these things are printed out,
2 0 there is a slightly different format the first time the
2 1 report is generated for the -- for the receiver or
22 customer.
23
Q. Well, and that was going to be my next
24 question. Does No. 4 appear to be the type of report
2 5 that would be printed for the ordering party?
Page I!
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'A: Yes.

1

3 this helps clarify it or not, hut I notice it says,
4 physician or doctor report on this particular exhibit.
THE WITNESS: That would probably reflect the
5
6 coroner as the recipient of that.
7
Q. (BY MS. BIUZEE) Well, let me ask you this
8 question -- Mr. Helfrich makes a good point.
Is there anything in these records -- I'm
9
1 indication of who ordered the report; right, or who
.2 ordered the specimen to be analyzed, or would that just
3 be on the order sheet?
.4
A. Well, let's see the official one. Oh, the -5 from this, the ordering physician is listed as me. This
6 is -- a lot of the submissions by the coroner's office

Q. That would go hack to your earlier comment to

8

Q. It has a collection time of 0542, but we know
9 the coroner collected this specimen, so I'm assuming

1
A. That's correct.
2
Q. But, certainly, you have a received time of
3 0542, which, to me, indicates that's when the specimen
4 came to the lab?
5
A. That's when it was -- would be when it was

8 by the information system.

You have to he in a position to be qualified
10 to make an order. The coroner is not -- is not going to
.9

9
Q. There's another status indication up here;
0 "STATUS: REG REF," what does that mean?

: 2 test. So that's why we've done it this way. These are
13 the constraints of the information system.

1 questions have been raised about Deposition Exhibit No.
2 7, also, what I'm going to refer to as Deposition

1 11/7/06, and a time, which, to me, indicates the time

3 Exhibit No. 2, because that's the document that we've

3 I'm looking up here in this

2 that this actual report was printed; is that accurate?

--

5 some matters surrounding the analysis of this blood
6 specimen.

7

I also know that you've talked to either

7

8 Mr. Helfiich or someone from his office and myself. And

9 what I want to ask you, before we get into what yon have
looked for, and what you have found relative to this
.1 specimen is: Has any conversation with any attorney
.2 influenced what you did to check into the issues
- 3 surrounding this blood specimen?
-4
A. No. Absolutely not.
.5
Q. So let's look at this report. And let me just
.6 start with the issues that have been -- well, actually,
.7 let's go through, and I'm going to have you explain some
-8 of this stuff at the top.
.9
It looks to me from these print outs -- I'm
!0 looking at 2, you're looking at 7, I believe they have
!1 the same information -- that this specimen came in, it
!2 was entered at 0544. Is that the time that the specimen
!3 is accepted -- well, no. Order 0542?
A. It was entered on the 5th of October, 1903 -!4
!5 excuse me, 2003.
.O

Q. Well, at least the one that you've produced to

8 us today, Exhibit 7, you've printed out today; correct?

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. Yes. Is that the same as -Q. This one was printed out, I believe -- if the
run date is the print date -- 8-30-06, I believe at the
request of Mr. Heltiich's office.
A. All right. That would compare.
Q. Down here in this section there's an entered
time and date entered by lab. And I believe K. Higgins
would be Kathy Higgins?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, would she be the lab employee who would
have run this blood analysis then?
A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.
Q. Have you talked to Kathy Higgins?
A. Yes.
Q. And does she recall running this particular
specimen or anything that happened with this specimen?
A. Not specifically.
Page 1 9
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6. 'when you say, "not specifically," that means

1
A. You know, it's in months or years. I don't
2 know. That information is possible, but it's no longer

2 there may be some recollection, generally.
Can you tell us what she told you?
4
A. That's in -- you know, in reference to trying

4
5

8

Q. You've looked for it?
A. Yes.

through these work -- you know, these individual data

However, you know, she did recall, at the
1 0 time, there was a -- a problem with the results in the
11 laboratory system.
12
Q. What exactly did she tell you about these

these, or how does it actually work?

1 screen where the results are displayed, or is that a
2 problem with the transfer of data to the lab's storage

1 far as I know, there's nobody in charge of the -- you
2 know, the notes.
4
5
6
7
8
9

5 to the laboratory storage system.
6
Q. Okay. So it would be --okay.

0
1
2
3

0

Q. You must not keep them for very long?
A. No. You know, it's probably in terms of a

2

Q. What does this date up here, last reported

9

A. You can get a print out of a ship with the
patient's name, and the calculations, and the results.
Q. And do we have that strip?
A. No. They are not archived this long.
Q. So when would that strip have --how long
would that striu have been around?

0

1
2
3
4

I

5

They are on schedule, and they're stored in
containers. And as they're dated for, you know, the
periods of time when they're done, and then the period
of time for expiration, you know, periodically those
containers are gone through, and then they're shredded.
Q. Thank you. That explained how these things
are stored. Because I suspect if we go out in the lab
or to some storage area, you would have strips going
back for some period of time?
A. Yes.
Q. But you don't have strips going back to

3 mean? What is that referring to?

4
A. You know, since it looks like today's date, it
5 was the last time it was -- there was an inquiry
. . in the
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3
4
5
6

7
8
9
0
1

2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

0
1

2

11, my Exhibit No. 2 has a last reported
date of 10-30-04.
A. So that was printed out at a different time.
That's the date when it was printed out of the
information system.
Q. The last date it would have been printed
before this one was printed?
A. Yeah. That's the date that was retrieved out
of the archive.
Q. Do we have any way of trying to figure out who
requested the 10-30-04print out?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. What does, "LAST ACT:" indicate?
A. I'm going to -- I thiithat is today's date.
It's the last time tliis was requested.
Q. Oh, is yours today's date?
A. Yes. 11/07/06. I just had this printed out,
because I had a copy in my office.
Q. Oh, no. I'm looking at, "LAST ACT:
10/05/03-0548."
A. Oh, that one?

4
A. That was -- you know, I assume it's the
5 previous -- last acquisition, or, you h o w I mean,

--

Paae 2 4

1 there are people who can tell you what that means, but
2 it may be the last time it was printed oul. And I think

3 that -- does that match yours?
Q. It does.
5
A. Okay. So it's probably a record of the times
6 in the past it was accessed for reprinting or
7 rereporting.
Q. What about this review date of 10/06/03 at
8
9 0739? And then it says, "LAB.ARE," or lab something
1 0 ARE. What does that mean?
11
A. That was when the results were --oh, let's
1 2 see. That was probably when the results were last
1 3 reviewed.
14
Q. Okay.
A. They have to be -- before transfer from the
15
1 6 automated equipment to archives, they have to be
1 7 reviewed.
18
Q. By a supewisor?
19
A. No. Well, that's usually by the person
2 0 performing it.
21
Q. What does this information down here mean,
22 10/05/03-0545,0545,0547,0548, and then a 10-06 0500,
2 3 and then it says, ".BROADCAST."
A. I can't address that. I don't know.
24
2 5 That's -Paae
- 25
4
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1
Q. Who would be able to address that for us, if
2 we needed someone?

A. Probably somebody in the information
3
4 technology department, or probably the person in the
5 laboratory responsible for overseeing the computer.
Q. And then down here we have the results;
6
7 correct?
8
A. That's correct.
9
Q. Under results. And we have a 10/05/03-0546,
.O and we have a .19 result?
-1
A. That's correct.
.2
Q. And then we have, alcohol previously reported
.3 as 0.00 percent?
.4
A. That's correct.
5
Q. And, again, you have done some investigation
- 6 into -- well, then we have this edited comment by
.7 Kathy Higgins.
-8
A. Yes.
Q. Let me ask you this: Did Kathy Higgins have
-9
! 0 any recollection of why -- well, actually, I'm going to
! 1 take a step back.
!2
What does this mean when somebody edits, where
:3 there's this edited by statement on a report?
!4
A. That would indicate they're correcting a
5 previous result.

/2

Paae 2 6

1
Q. Does the previous -- is this the previous
2 result then that she would be correcting, is the 0.00

3 percent?
A. That's correct.
Q. And then she has written, "REASON: COMPUTER
6 DIFFICULTIES!'
7
And have we already talked about that's the
8 interfacing between the computer equipment that's part
9 of the analysis machine interfacing with the lab
1 0 computer?
11
A. Yes.
Q. Did she give you any more details, as far as
12
1 3 her recollection of what happened, or what she did?
14
A. No. No. That's it. And I asked her, you
1 5 know, is this corrected result a true result? And she
1 6 assured me it was.
Q. The.197
17
18
A. That's correct.
19
Q. And down here is the -- it says, "ENT." I'm
20 assuming, you correct me if I'm wrong, that's when she
2 1 would have entered her edit; is that correct, or what
22 does that mean?
23
A. Let's see. That's -- I would assume that's
24 the time at which the results above were edited.
25
Q. Okay. What does this, "Method: RXLB," mean?
Paae
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i A.' That refers to the instrument. That's an
2 abbreviation for the name on the instrument.
3
Q. The computer analysis equipment that we use to
4 analyze the blood serum?
5
A. Yeah. That's the automated chemistry
6 equipment.
Q. Is that the same as the automated analyzer?
7
8
A. That's correct.
9
Q. And then down here is another entry,
0 "10105-0544." What does that stand for, "Autodfi"?
1
A. I can't answer that. I'd have to have it
2 looked up and explained. These are things that are part
3 of the print out that leave -- that sort of are data
4 points for an operation. But what the abbreviation is,
5 I would have to check with the people in information
6 technology, or the individual in the laboratory
7 responsible.
8
Usually these tbings are - you know, they're
9 printed on the reports, but they are not the actual
0 value. So I can't comment on that. But the information
1 as to exactly what that abbreviation refers to is
2 available.
3
Q. So, again, if we wanted more information on
4 that we need to talk to vour comvuter information
5 systems person?
Page 28

A. No.
Q. And again, these issues were raised, and you
3 did some investigation to try to fmd out what had
4 happened with this blood specimen; correct?
5
A. That's correct.
6
Q. And you wrote a letter to us on November 1,
7 '06 explaining, in part, on what your investigation
8 concluded.
9
I need to know, what exactly did you do as
1 0 p a t of your investigation? We know you talked to
11 Kathy Higgins. I'm assuming that was part of your
1 2 investigation?
13
A. That was a part of the initial investigation.
14
Q. Did you talk to any of the computer
1 5 information people, like Millie?
16
A. No, not at that time.
17
Q. I-Iave you talked to her since then?
18
A. Yes.
Q. In your letter you say a result was hand
19
20 entered. What exactly does that mean?
21
A. She recalled the problems with the transfer of
22 information at that time. And what she related to me
23 was, that the information system had an update on it,
24 and if you allowed it to comvlete a calculation. it
5 wouldho the calculation twice. It was a quirkbf the

A. Yes.
Q. Who is that person?
2
3
A. Well, see, there's a group there, and then the
4 person in the lab is Millie. I'm blocking on her last
5 name.
6
Q. Nelly?
7
A. Millie.
8
Q. Millie, M-I-L-LI-E?
9
A. Yes.
10
Q. What about under here, there's a method, and
11 then it says, "RXLA"?
12
A. That's the abbreviation for the automated
1 3 chemistry equipment.
Q. What's the difference between the RXLB and the
14
1 5 RXLA? Do you have two different -16
A. We have two different ones. And that
17 particular part of the record -- I can't accurately
18 answer that. I could obtain the information, but that's
19 part of the equipment record.
20
Q. Do we know if this particular blood specimen
21 was run inore than once through the automated analyzer?
22
A. I -- you know, from this, I don't know, you
23 know.
24
Q. Well, was Kathy Higgins able to tell you
2 5 whether or not it had been run twice?
Paae 29

1 programming. And because they had identified that, they

1

1

2
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2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9
10

11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

modified the operation so the calculation was done by
the technician running the instrument. The error -- the
software error has been corrected.
Q. Let me see if I understand what you've just
told me, because I'm not sure if I do. So let me go
back through it.
A. Let's go through it. Review it.
Q. So what calculation was involved?
A. The transfer of -- let's see. In terms of
milligrams per volume, &omthat into a percent.
Q. So on my Document No. 2, and your Document No.
7, we have a .I9 result.
In your letter you indicate that actually
means milligrams per -A. Deciliter.
Q. Deciliter?
A. Yes.
Q. This document, however, does not -- Document
No. 2 does not reflect that the .I9 is a milligram per
deciliter; correct?
A. It does not give results.
(Cell phone interruption.)
Q. (BY MS. BRIZEE) So explain to me, again, the
calculation. Apparently, there was a software error and
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1 know, there is no normal value for alcohol. The
2 alcohol -- if you analyze a blood specimen, and you can
3 get an alcohol level, that reflects the fact that it has
4 been ingested. And the reference range that's listed is

'1 a kaiculation was performed twice due to that error;
3
4
5
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A. That's correct.
Q. And it was the calculation -- tell me, again.
A. It was the fact that the calculation was done

7 operating technician.
8
Q. Do you mean done twice, as in, it just did the
9 calculation twice, and you got the result twice?

My understanding is, the laws of the State of
0 Idaho say the legal limit is .08. I don't know what the
1 tag line is after the .08. Is it milligrams per
3
4

A. It's percent.
Q. Percent? Okay.
So is it possible this .19 result is .19

7
A. Now, how do you want this answered, because
8 this is -- you know, one way or the other, you're going
9 to get the interpretation I had when I interviewed
0 Kathy Higgins. She said that was correct.
1
Q. That his blood alcohoi level was .19 percent?
2
A. Yes. And in preparation for this deposition,

1 because that's where I lost you.
2
A. The calculation is to change -- this is
3 milligrams per deciliter -- into a percent.
4
Q. And when we look at documents, and we see .19,

--

4
5
6

5 we look at that and say, that is the blood alcohol level
6 for Ted Cox?
7
A. That would be a reasonable conclusion, but the

8 units are not stated.
9
Q. Well, they are not stated. So how, on -- if
1 0 we pulled some lab report out today, and we had a blood
11 alcohol level, would the units be stated on the lab
1 2 report?
A. Yes.
13
14
Q. How would they be stated?
A. In -- with a percent figure. As -- if you
15
1 6 look for the reference range, you know, one column over
1 7 it says reference.
Here, this is result. This is reference
18
1 9 (indicating).
20
Q. I'm tracking with you.
A. And the reference is not that it's normal, but
21
22 it has been referenced to the legal limit.
Q. So that reference percentage, you're telling
23
2 4 us today, is his blood alcohol level?
25
A. The reference, no. That is the range. You
Page 33
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1 chemistry, told me that this probably was a situation
2 where the calculation was not done. Now, I'm looking at
3 this you know, I'm getting conflicting information.

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. That's okay. We're not here to ask you to
answer our questions one way or the other. We're trying
to find out what actually happened, because these issues
have been raised. So let me go hack.
When you talked to Kathy Higgins, then, she
told you the .19 result is .I9 percent? In her opinion,
that is an accurate result; correct?
A. When I talked with her, that's what she
relayed to me, was, this was -- then it represents a
blood alcohol that's out of the range that's listed.
It's into the illegal range, if you will.
And when I initially was reflecting this with
the phone calls, that was my information. And the
fact -- I think I related to both parties in this, in
terms of the counsel, the document had some problems
with it, because there was a reflection of a correction
in it, which tells you, you know, that -- what was being
corrected, what was wrong, is this a reliable result?
And with the information I had at that time,
you know, I think -- I informed at least one of the
counsels that I've considered it a medically reliable
result. That it was not -- it had no value as a legal
Page 35
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1' alcdhoi for criminal purposes. And, you know, because
2 we do not subscribe -- we are not a forensic laboratory.
3 And that's the issue here.
4
Q. Well, let me stop right there, and then let's
5 go back to this.
6
But the fact that you don't have forensic by
7 your name, does that mean that all of your lab results,
8 day in and day out, are inaccurate?
9
A. No.
Q. I mean, day in and day out, isn't your opinion
10
11 that your lab results are accurate?
12
A. That's correct. It is my opinion that they
1 3 are.
14
Q. And as far as reporting to a physician, for
1 5 patient care purposes, this is something -- this . l 9 is
1 6 something, would it not, that would be reported to a
1 7 patient's physician and represented to he accurate?
18
A. That's correct.
19
Q. So the issue with forensic -- and we're kind
2 0 of in the middle, because you talked about, medically
2 1 it's accurate. For criminal purposes, it's not. We're
22 not either. We're in the middle in a civil case.
23
A. Iundersland.
24
Q. But I understand that you're not a forensic
2 5 lab. But let me ask you this: As far as a hospital lab
Page 36
'

A. No. These -- I'm referring to the usual
2 medical specimen. Now, we have, in a situation -- we're
3 offering a service to the coroner's office, and the
4 system will not allow them, as non-physician's, you
5 know, ordering tests. So, you know, to handle this, I
6 agreed to have my name put as the ordering physician any
7 time they wanted to use this avenue.
8
They use it in terms of collaring information
9 on coroner's cases to assist them in determining the
1 0 cause of death. They've recognized these values -11 laboratory results as having limited value or no value
1 2 in a legal setting, but it's often useful value in
1 3 determining the cause of death or understanding the
1 4 circumstances around that.
15
Q. Let me ask you this question: In your
1 6 investigation, did you f i d any indication that the
1 7 blood that was analyzed and reported as Ted Cox's blood
1 8 sample was not from Ted Cox?
19
A. I have no indication that it was not from
2 0 Ted Cox.
21
Q. In your statement in this letter, it says the
22 calculation -- you say the .19 is milligrams per
23 deciliter. What is that statement based on, if
24 Kathy Higgins is telling you it's .I9 percent?
25
A. Okay. That's based on the subsequent, you
Page 3 8
1

1 versus a forensic lab, what's the difference?
2
A. The forensic lab has a chain of evidence on
3

4
5
6
7

8
9
10

11
12

13
14
15
16

17

18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

1 know, investigation that was done by Millie, who's the
2 chief of chemistry and also runs the information system.
collection, all the way from the individual who
3 This was her recollection, because she remembered the
4 information on the error, the glitch, and the fact that
collected it, through every step of the way -- any time
5 it was corrected.
there was a change of hands. There's an accession into
the forensic laboratory with signatures, dating, and so
6
Q. So is Millie the same as Amelia Rennaux?
on.
7
A. Yes. That's her.
And then there was a chain of custody, in
8
Q. So she told you she had a specific
9 recollection of Ted Cox's blood analysis?
terms of who operated -- who handled the specimen, who
ran it, and a check on the results, so that, you know -10
A. No. She had a specific recollection of the
I1 computer problem, not specifically the -- it's the
the possibility of people making mistakes along the way
1 2 problem -- she had recollection of the problems related
because it was handed off to different individuals, it
could have been mixed up, something could have gone
1 3 to the blood alcohols and the software glitch, as they
1 4 would apply to Ted Cox's specimen.
wrong.
15
So you could -- you have a more reasonable
As to specific reference -- you know,
assurance that the results are related to the specimen
1 6 remembering that particular specimen, no. That
1 7 statement may he worded so that could be interpreted,
that was originally drawn. You know, this is the
criminal accuracy that's required. And that's under the
1 8 but the thing is, that, you know, she remembers that,
1 9 you know, around that time there was one of those
designation of forensic lab.
2 0 updates, and that this problem came out of it. That is
Q. But let me ask you this question, because
we've kind of veered into chain of custody: This
2 1 why they had the individual tech during the transition
2 2 period put in the correction.
specimen came in with a name, a date, and the initials
23
of the individual drawing the specimen; correct?
Q. And that is how I read Millie's statement. I
4 mean, her statement says that the alcohol testing
In order for it to be accepted by the lab, I
5 performed back in '03 was hand entered as .19 MGDL.
believe you said it had to have these three -Page 37
Page 39
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So that's partly why I asked you at the
2 beginning: Okay. Where is that hand entry? Where is
3 that documentation?
4
A. The hand entry is in terms of the calculation
5 -- is the calculation with respect to the -- what you
6 can do at the interface. That's manual --you know,
7 they had to perform that multiplication manually.
8 Basically, it's moving the decimal points.
9
Q. So her statement is just generally saying, if
0 there was a problem with this specimen, here's,
1 generally, what was going on at this time, and this
2 could have happened with this specimen?
3
A. That's -- yeah. Her investigation was to give
4 me a more in depth explanation of why that original
5 result had this phrase, previously reported as, or there
.6 was a correction.
.7 Q. But from your conversatio~~s
with Millie, she
8 does not have a specific recollection of what happened
9 with Ted Cox's blood sample?
0
A. Not as a specific Ted Cox's specimen. It was,
1 you know, in reference to the date it was done, and the
2 problems that she recalled that were in this area.
3
Q. Because she has in here a conclusion the
4 calculation was not performed. But from what you're
5 tellmg me then, she doesn't really know that?
1

1 layer of collection. That's totally unacceptable.
2
There is no -- you know, so at this point -- I

3 mean, all I have to say is, this has no value. And, yon
4 know, it was like -5
Q. But let me ask you this question: But
6 Kathy Higgins has told yon that she did do the
7 calculation. So if you -8
A. She told me it was a correct result. I
9 can't -- you know, in terms of the caiculation, I can't
1 0 address that particular part. She toid me that this
11 accepted result reflected the blood alcohol.
12
Q. So now, unless I'm misinterpreting,and if I
13 am,then you tell me, but what I'm hearing you say is,
1 4 Kathy Higgins, the lab tech who performed this test, is
1 5 saying the .l9 result is the percentage?
16
A. That is how I interpreted her reassurance, you
17 know. And that is why, you know, I did make statements,
1 8 is that tlds was a medically reliable result.
19
Q. So if you believe Kathy Higgins, it's a
2 0 medically reliable result?
21
A. If, you know -- if we're at that point, yes.
22
Q. Have you gone back and talked to Kathy Higgins
23 again?
A. No, I have not.
24
25
Q. And if I'm hearing you correctly, Millie,
Page 40
Page 4;

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
0

1

2
3
4
5
6

7
8

9
0
1

2
3
4
5

A. Well, that's her conclusion, that it was not
performed, and that made the .I9 --it was --you know,
as she related the information to me, she said the .19
was not -- didn't have the multiplication by 100 to make
it a percent. And so she said that her opinion was that
the calculation was not perfonned. And that it was
basically -At that point, I just about lost it, because,
you know, this is --so I just told her to repeat the
results or get me another specimen. That, you know, I'm
not -- as director here, I am not going to have any
record like this where we have a series of corrections.
To me, as director, you know -- in -- the
reports had gotten into a situation where, from my
standpoint, and from being responsible for their
accuracy, I simply had to say, no, I'm not -- you've got
two corrections in this situation, and as far as I'm
concerned, nothing of either of these results is worth
anything, from my judgment standpoint.
And, you know, I told her, I want it repeated.
Well, we don't have the specimen. So, you know, if I'm
going to say one of these or the other is medically
interpretable -- at that point, no, they're no longer,
because not only was the document questionable initially
because there was a correction, now there's a second

1 Amelia Rennaux, wrote this document based on her
2 assumptions that the calculation was not done. She has
3 no personal knowledge as to whether or not Kathy Higgins
4 did or did not do the calculation; is that correct?
5
A. That's correct.
6
Q. Let me ask you this: In order to get -- say
7 we have a blood specimen that comes into the lab today.
8 We get a result of. 19 mg, milligrams per deciliter.
9 How -- is that a result that you have seen come out of
1 0 your computer analysis?
11
I mean, I don't know what that calculatesout
12 to be to a percentage.
13
A. No -- well, I think since this occurrence,
1 4 that computer software glitch has been corrected. So,
1 5 you know, you bring in a specimen now, it gets analyzed.
1 6 That transformation from units gets done correctly.
17 That pads been corrected.
18
Q. How -- what I'm trying to get at is: How
19 sensitive is your equipment? I mean, .I9 milligrams per
20 deciliter, is your equipment sensitive enough to
2 1 actually give you a report of. 19 -22
A. Repeatedly?
23
Q. -- milligrams per deciliter?
24
A. Yes. There wili be a small plus or minus on
25 that. But these instruments, their automated
Page 4 1
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i me~sukementsare accurate.
2
Q. And what do you mean, there would be a small
3 plus or minus on that?
4
A. Well, when you go out to several decimal
5 places beyond that, I'm referring to that part. But for
6 the most part, the precision of these current generation
7 of laboratory instruments are -- the numbers you have
8 are significant numbers.
9
Q. Let me ask you this question: On the
1 0 automated analyzer, you said a display will come up on
11 the computer screen attached to the automated analyzer;
1 2 correct?
13
A. Correct.
Q. And that's something that the lab tech can
14
1 5 look at, and what will the lab tech see on that computer
1 6 screen?
17
A. She'll -18
Q. Will they see a milligram per deciliter, or
1 9 will they see the percentage calculation?
20
A. They'll see the units, the milligrams per
2 1 deciliter, or if they've been -- if they're reported on
22 other units -- the units will be listed.
23
Q. If we needed to, do we have a way to go back
24 into your computer information system and try to figure
25 out what the editing was that was done by Kathy Higgins?
P a g e 44
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Q. Do you still have the same computers?
A. Yes. I mean, I can't address that. I don't
know how well the things inside the computer are
tracked.'
Q. And in order to figure out what, actually,
Kathy Higgins meant by the things she put in here, we
probably need to talk to Kathy Higgins?
A. Yes.
Q. I mean, is there some standard in the lab that
if you have a .19 result, and underneath is ALC
previously reported as 0.00 percent, that your . l 9 is
actually your percentage?
I mean, is there any standard policies for
cl~artingand editing?
A. No. That particular thing is outside of
standard policy to begin with, because there was a
correction on there.
Q. If you have -- when you have this software
glitch that basically did the calculation twice, was the
result that you were getting 0.00 percent blood alcohol
levels?
A. No. It would be --let's see. I cannot
address exactly which way it was being done. I think it
was, it was going to give a great -- a much greater
P a g e 45
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information. And I -- you know, that particular point
was, you know, was not something I was questioning.
I was -- when 1 was, you know, trying to get
all the facts to make sure I had all the information, by
involving Millie, it was to address the actual value of
this information, because I had -- you know, I hid a
telephone conversation -- said that -- you know, with
the conversation with Kathy Higgins, that I would
consider it medically reliable.
Q. And again, if you believe Kathy Higgins'
information to you, you still believe it would be
lnedically reliable; correct?
A. Well, there has been the subsequent
investigation to give a little better definition of what
was corrected, because it was -- you know, that's a
loose end there. That was, at that time, in talking -I forget which one of you 1 talked to on the phone about
this, but, you know, first of all, there was this
discussion by me that, well, this is an impeachable
result because it was corrected.
You know, that's you want to know why it
was corrected, and what it was corrected from, and, you
know, more details on that. And, you know, so this is
why -- you know, I knew this was going to be coming up.
P a g e 46

--

1 So when we got into affidavits, it was like, wait a

This is going to nail me down to something that
3 I don't have, you know.
4
But I did, over the phone, relate, 1 think,
5 the information that I thought this was medically
6 reliable. And then in preparation for the deposition, I
7 wanted to make sure I had everything covered. And what
8 it got me to the point was -- you know, I was a bit
9 furious at the laboratorypeople for, you know, this
1 0 thing. I just -- you know, this is, to me -- I'm just
11 still furious. This sort of thing is intolerable. And
1 2 it just happens to he on something that is now in civil
1 3 litigation.
14
Q. Who would we tak to if we wanted to know what
1 5 this software error did, this double calculation? Would
16 that be Millie?
17
A. Millie, that's correct.
18
MS. BRIZEE: I believe those are all the questions
1 9 1 have for you, Doctor.
20
Mr. Helfrich may have some, and 1may have
2 1 some follow up, but thank you for your time.
22
MR. HELFRICH: Could we get these two pages marked,
23 please?
24
MS. BRIZEE: 1 already have them marked, I think.
25
MR. HELFRICH: Are they?
P a g e 47
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MR. HELFRICH: Yeah.
MS. BRIZEE: Yours just looks a little bit -- you
4 just have a received stamp. I don't know what this is.

2
3

1
Q. We don't know how those issues impacted what
2 Kathy Higgins was doing; correct?
3
A. Correct.

6 questions for you.
8
A. With that information, to that level, I was 9 you know, it was a situation --it's not legally useful.

EXAMINATION
9 BY MR. HELFRICH:
10
Q. First of all, as you sit here today as the

14
A. No.
15
Q. And the two pages that I put in front of you
1 6 are your letter to defense counsel -- I don't have the
1 7 numbers. Could you tell me what those are?
18
A. Exhibits 5 and 6.
19
Q. So Exhibits 5 and 6 are your letter to defense
2 0 counsel and some notes that came from your chemistry
2 1 coordinator, the woman you've referred to as Millie?
22
A. Yes.

1

A. It is my understanding -- this is sort of

z like -- yes, it's an explanation, but, you know, the
3 circumstances in this, and this record of events with a

1

A. I could conclude to its accuracy with that

1 know, we're doing this in deposition, and there may be
2 more depositions. But the thing is, I made a statement
3 defending that document with that level of information.

4 And when I find out that there's more information that
5 wasn't related to me, and I defended that document, I
6 get -- you know, now -- you know, now I feel I can't
7 defend it if you're giving me additional information
8 that I didn't have at that time.
And the thing is, you know -- I find here

4 correction, and then a re-correction, you know, I
5 just -- I -- this sort of train of information on a
6 laboratory result is abominable, and I find it -- you
7 know, just, it's intolerable that this sort of thing can
And, you know, this is -- so this is what I
1 0 see as an explanation. But the fact that this is going
11 through two stages of correction, I mean, this is -- I

-- you know, is this medically reliable,
1 3 would I tell a physician to use it? No. You know, give

1 2 mean, is it

FURTWR EXAMINATION
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1

Q. Take your irritation away for a second.
A. So it's like -4
Q. All I want to know is: As we sit here today,
5 you've talked to Kathy Higgins, and Kathy Higgins has
6 told you the .19 is the blood alcohol percentage;
7 correct?
8
A. That's correct.
9
0.
. And that it is an accurate result: correct?
0
A. That's correct.
MS. B m E : Okay. Those are all the questions I
1
2 have.

2

42

3

3

3
4
FWRTHER EXAMINATION
5 BY MR.HEiLFRICH:
6
Q. Doctor, just a follow up on that.
You said that you would medically defend it if
7
8 that was the only information you had, but you got more
9 information later?

A. That's correct.
Q. And you can't medically defend it now?
A. No.
MR. HELF'RICH: Thank you. No further questions.

0

1
2
3

4 111
5 Ill

Paae 52

4
5

Q. We're just speculating; correct?
A. Well, I'm assuming they happened, because I
have to assurne the worst in this case.
Q. Well, but if we assume the best, then it would
be a medically reliable document; correct?
A. If I could rely on Kathy Higgins' information.
MS. BRIZEE: Okay. Those are all the questions I
have.

6
7
8
9
.O
FURTHER EXAMINATION
-1 BY MR. HEURICH:
-2

Q. Are you prepared to do that today with the

- 3 other information you have?

A. Do what?
Q. Rely on Kathy Higgins' information.
-6
A. With the additional information?
.7
Q. With the additional information.
-8
A. I mean, I wouldn't even talk about this as
- 9 information anymore.
!0
Q. It's not reliable?
!1
A. You know, it's -- well, it's just, you're
!2 looking at it from two steps. I'm looking at it from
!3 many steps. And they bring in, you know, things that
!4 I'm concerned about that are additional things that, you
5 know, I just -- you know, it's just, I don't -- 1won't
-4
.5

/2

Paae 5 4

1
FURTHER EXAMINATION
2 BY MS.BRIZEE:
3
Q. What do you mean by medically defend it? I

4 mean-5
A. Well, just, you know, if a physician asked me,
6 can I use this information? You know, the patient
7

claims he wasn't drinking. He shouldn't be drinking.

9 other'? You know, at one level it seems correct, but
LO
L1
-2
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So at one point I could say something, and as

--

4 a result of that
5
Q. We're only talking about that -6
A. -- you guys are here.

Q. We're only talking about today.
With all the information you have today, are
9 you prepared to defend it medically today, based on all
7

then if you find out there's more things -- and it's
just not that -- it's not an additional piece of
information. Now itCsthe fact that, okay, there was

-4 system that I'm irritated with, and, you know, we get,
L5 you know, to add in issues, you know.
L6
I just -- the thing is, it boils down to the
L7 fact that, simply, at the point where I got the
L8 information from Kathy, it seemed as if, to the best of
- 9 her recollection, I could rely on herjudgment. And
? 0 then the other things that start getting introduced into
'1 this scenario, are the possibility of at least two more
!2 errom.
Z3
Q. But we don't know if those two other errors
!4 occurred; correct?
'5
A. That's correct.

4
5
6

7
8
9
0
1
2

3
4

FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MS. BRIZEE:
Q. Well, and my final question is: Are you
prepared today to take and discard everything
Kathy Higgins says, and tell us that this is 100 percent
an inaccurate finding?
A. I'm simply saying, from the initial point of
getting information from the report that there was a
correction from her that she, you know, said was
reliable, and then we find a series of other things, you
know, the thing is, I don't -Q. I mean, do you know?
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

1

1 Go&, I can't you know, if we put the whole thing
2 together, it's just, this whole thing is worthless.

Q. Well -A. If we can rely on Kathy Higgins, yes. If we
have to put in somebody else's information, and we find
out there's flawed software, and then there's a question
about somebody who forgot to do it, that's two more
errors. And then, you know, this gets into -Q. Well, but we don't know that she forgot to do
it. I mean, from what she told you, she did do it.
A. Well, sort of. At this point, you know -Q. We won't know until we talk to Kathy Higgins?
A. From my standpoint, taking all these things
into account -- I mean, this is abomination. You know,
it's just like, none of this is worth anything. And,
you know, I want to take steps to make sure that
something like this can never occur again.
And, you know, we just -- you know, you see I
made reference to -- you know, the thing is, you know,
we did this work for the coroner. We're not going to do
anything that in any way can allow for mistakes to be
incorporated into a report.
Q. But you can't sit here today and tell us that
you know Kathy Higgins made a mistake?
A. No. I can't be certain of anything.

2
3
4
5
6
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STATE OF IDAHO )
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1, ANDREA L. CHANDLER, Certified Shorthand Reporter
and Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, do
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That prior to being examined, the witness named in
the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to testify
to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth;

12
That said deposition was taken down by me in
13 shorthand at the time and place therein named and
1 4 thereafterreduced to typewriting under my direction,
1 5 and that the foregoing transcript contains a full, true
1 6 and verbatim record ofsaid deposition.
17
I further certify that I have no interest in the
1 8 event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 14th day of November,
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20
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ANDREA L. CHANDLER
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25 My Commission Expires: 7-20-10
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MS. BREEE: Okay. Those are all the questions I

2 have.

3
4

(The deposition was concluded at 2:45 p.m.)
(Signature requested.)
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S1eve.n K. Tdrnan (iSB #I
769)
JenniPer Kauth Brizee (ISB #5(370)
TOLMAN, BRlZEE & MARTENS, P.C.
132 grdAvenue East
Post Qffios Box 1 296
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1 2 7 6
Telephone: (208)733-5566

OC? 3 0 2006
CANYC)N COUNTY CLERK

T.CRAVVFOBD, DEPUTY

Attorney tor Defendants

IN THE DIGTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY DF CANYON
* * * * * * I * *

MARY KATHRYN SORENS-EN and
COX,

)
)

1
Plain-tifis,

)

C a s e No. CV 04- 1 0 9 5 9

1
vs.
SHANE EDWARD McKAY,.:DA.VID
NIcKAY and VIVIAN McKAY,
Defendants.

TO:

)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF T:&EIN:G
$P,~
. . ".. s
. I. T
. .; ~
. .. .~. ~
. ) uTECIJM
:&
.OF

- ~ & .....
~ M & s ' M ,D O $ ~ R D E Q ~M.D,
&~~~,

)
)

T h ~ m a sM. Donndelinger, M.D.
Mercy Medical Center
1 5 12 12Ih A.venue .Rd.
Narnpa, ID 83686

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WllL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendants will
take the deposition upon oral examination of THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER, M.D.,
before a qualified Court Reporter, on Tuesday, t h e 7th day of November, 2 0 0 6 , at
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM
OF THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER, M.D., PAGE -1-

I

I

..

1

the h ~ u of
r 1:00 o'ciook p.m., and continuing thereafter from day t o day until such
time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the Mercy Medtcal Center,
1512 1Zih Avenue Rd., Nampa, idaho 83686, pursuant to Ruie 30ia) of the idaho

Rules of Civii Procedure.
Said deponent is required to bring with him the originals plus one copy of the
following:
Any and all documents concerning Ted Cox, Mary Kathryn Sorensen, andlor the
subject matter of this litigation. The term "document" means and includes any and all
records, notes, reports, consultations, invoices, analyses, charts, or any other document
relative to this matter provided to or received by you, whether or not ganerated by you,
I

~

contained within your file or in your possession, as well as all documents relied upon,
referred Yo orconsulted by you in rendering your opinions in this .matter or generated by
you. The term "documenP also means and inciudes any kind of written, typewritten, or
printed material whatsoever, including, but hot limited to, papers, agreements, notes,
memoranda, correspondence, letters, telegrams, statements, books, reports, studies,
minutes, records, analyses, surveys, transcriptions, and recordings of which you have any
knowledge or information, whether in your possession or control or not, reiating to or
pertaining in any way to the instant subject matter; and inciudes, but without limitation,
originais, aii file copies, and all other copies, no matter how or by whom prepared, and all
drafts prepared in connection with such writing, whether used or not.

DATED this &%y

of October, 2006.

...

,

.. ..... ...

. . . ..,.

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM
OF THOMAS M. OONNDELINGER, M.D., PAGE -2-

.

~

.

I hereby certify that on this *day

of October, 2006, 1 delivered a true and

I

correct .copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF TAKING DEPO$lTlON DUCES TECUM OF

THOMAS M. DONNDELINGER, M.D,, by +acsimile rransrnission and depositing same

!

in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope, addressed t o the

,,

..

4

,

Thomas M, Donndelinger, M.D,
Mercy Medioal Center
15.12 12" Avenue Rd.,
Nampa, ID 83B.8.6
(208) 463-5070

Tim J. Helfrich
YTURRI ROSE
P.0, Box 450
~ruitland,ID 8361 9
(547)889-2432
Associated Reporting, Inc
1 6 1 8 W. Jefferson St.
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 343-4002

NOTICE O F TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM
OF T H O M A S M. DONNDELINGER, M.D., PAGE -3,
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4635010 KKC LLbOXbtoXY

DIAGNOSTIC PATHOLOGY SERVICES, INC,
Thomas M. Donndelinger, M.D.
Joseph D Kronz, M.D.

Mercy Medical Center
1512 12" Avenue Road
Nampa, Idaho 83686
(208) 466-2663.
Fax: (208) 463-5070
November 1, 2006
Steven I<. Toman
Jennifer X, Brizee
Tolman, Brizee 6r Martens, PC
122 3" Avenue East
POBC office BOX 1276
Twin Falls, Idaho 83302-1276
Re:

Deposition scheduled at Mercy Medical Center on 11/7/05

In prcparar;ion for the deposition, an internal review by rhe hemi is try Coordinator
performed to try get as accurate detail as possible on the blood alcohol in
dispute on.Ted Cox.

was

The conclusion of this investigation is considered as accurate as possible
considering che reconstruction necessary. The blood alcohol specimen was brought
into the laboratory at Mercy Medical Center early in thc morning. The test was sun.
The result was hand entered at 0.19 mg/dL. The calculation to change it to percent
was not performed. Results of blood alcohol determinatiobs are normally reported i n
a percentage, and if that calculation had been done, the result would have been
Ttj.6 noted on the report that these results "should not be used for non0.0%.
medical purposes". R chain of custody is not maintained.
This resting was done ae a community service for the coronerst oftice due to budget
constraints. Enclosed is a copy of that summary. Because of the reinterpretation of
the results, I feel the laboratory report has absolutely no informational value at
this poinr. I could not recommend its use and no longer can interpret these results
as either accurate or inaccurate.
we are discontinuing any community services Lor law enforcement or coroners' work
in this laboratoxy.
sincerely,

Enclosure
Cc:

Tim J. Helfrich
Yturzi Rose
P. 0. Box ?SO
Pruitxand, Idaho 83619

11/0112006 WED L2:35

P

4 3 5 0 7 0 NWC Lbborltory

It appears that due to a program update to thc computcr systcm, that thc alcohol tcsting
performed back in 2003 on Tcd Cox wns hmd enterod ns 0.19 mddL. The calculation
was not perfomed, We ~eporiout pcrccntagc and>thcrclbre, thc percentage would bc
O,O"/o, Thse rcsults should not bc used Tor non-inedioal prirposes. A chain of custody
is not maintdncd on thcsc spccirne~?~.
This was discussed with Bill at Canyon Counly Coroner's office im 110/.31/06.
Anelia Remaux,
Chemistry Coordinator

...
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,

SPEC#:

1005:CH00026U

OFD FOR:
COLL:
RECV:
ATT DR:

ENTERED:
COLL BY:
LAST RPTD:
LAST ACT:

10/05/03-0544

REVIEWED:
ORDERED:

1 0 / 0 6 / 0 3 - 0 7 3 9 LAB.ARE
ALCOHOL PANEL
SOURCE: BLOOD

11/07/06-1310
10/05/03-0548

.

.

.

.

, ,.

.

. . . . . . ,.-.

ENTBY:
LAB.XHIGG1 r ..
RCV BY:
LAB. KHIGGI ::
WKLD~FN:
BAR C D # : l 2 7 0 5 0

COL CATEG:
ORD S I T E : MMC
RCV S I T E : MMC

.

OTHR.DR :

.

TRANSIT S I T E :
POINT OF TESTING
DATE-TIME
RCV DEFT

PERFORM S I T E

RPT AUDIT: 1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3
10/05/03
10/05/03
10/05/03
10/06/03
, 10/31/06

.

CLIENT PHONE:

..

.

QUERIES:

0545
0545
0547
0548
0500
1053

PAGE 1

10/05/03-0542
STATUS:
COMP
, "
REQ # : 0 0 1 3 7 6 3 3
1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3 - 0 5 4 2 --- SUBM DR: D o n n d e l i n g e r , T h o m a s MD
10/05/03-0542
P T AGE AT COLL: 5 0
.

PT ID:

.

.BROADCAST
.BROADCAST
.BROADCAST
.BROADCAST
MMCMRF
MMCSUM

USR

LRB

C o n t i n u e d on next page

...

AT S I T E
MMC

(208)463-5271

PAGE 2
UN TIME: 1311
WN USE,R : LAB.ARE

,
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End of Report
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Dennis Benjamin
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, W 83701
(208) 343-1000

JUN 0 4 2007
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
DEPUTY

Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE McKAY,
Petitioner,

1
1
1

CASE NO. CV 07-728C

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

VS.

1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Respondent.

ORIGINAL

COMES NOW, Shane McKay, and hereby files his Notice of Appeal. As required by
!AR 17, Mr. McKay states:

1) He appeals from the District Court's order denying Mr. McKay's motion for summary
disposition and the order granting the State's motion for summary disposition.
2) The issue on appeal is whether petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel

during his criminal case.
3) This Court has jurisdiction under IAR 1l(a)(l).
4) The transcript from the May 21,2007, motion hearing has been requested.
5 ) The following documents, in addition to those automatically included in the clerk's

record, should be included:
1

NOTICE OF APPEAL

* Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Memorandum in Support of Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
State's Answer
State's Motion for Summary Disposition
Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery
Petitioner's Request that the Court Take Judicial Notice
State's Objection to Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery
Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition
Memorandum in Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and in Support
of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
Notice of Filing of Exhibits
Motion for Relief from Judgment
6 ) The court reporter has been served with this notice of appeal.
7) The estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record and transcript has not been

paid because petitioner is requesting that he be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.

8) Counsel certifies that he has served all persons required to be served by Rule 20.

T

DATED THIS @day

of ~ u n 2007.
e

Attorney f& Shane ~

2

NOTICE OF APPEAL

c

~

a

~

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.s+

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this L 7 a y of June 2007, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be
7

)(
-mailed, by U.S. Mail postage pre-paid
hand delivered

-faxed
to:

Gearld Wolff
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany
Caldwell, I
D 83605
Carole Walden
Court Reporter
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany
Caldwell, ID 83605

Dennis Benjamin

3

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Dennis Benjamin
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McJSAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274 (0
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE McKAY,
Petitioner,

1

CASE NO. CV 0700728C

1
1

MOTION TO PROCEED ON
APPEAL IN FORMA
PAUPERIS AND TO
APPOINT STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

vs.
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
)

Respondent.

1

ORIGINAL

COMES NOW, Shane McKay, and asks this Court to permit him to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis and to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender to represent him on his appeal
from the order denying post-conviction relief. Mr. McKay's parents have been paying the legal
fees associated with the case thus far but the retainer has been depleted and they are not able to
continue to pay.
The Court previously appointed Mr. McKay the services of SAPD on direct appeal from
his criminal conviction. His financial situation has not changed since then. A true and correct
copy of Mr. McKay's Idaho Department of Correction Trust Fund Statement, which shows a

1

MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND TO APPOINT
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

balance of $474.15, is attached hereto.
DATED THIS h

'7
'
a y of ~ u n 2007.
e
Y
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Shane McKay

2

MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND TO APPOINT
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this E
of the foregoing document to be

y of June 2007, I caused a true and comct copy

r m a i l e d , by U.S. Mail portage pre-paid
hand delivered
-faxed

to:

Gearld Wolff
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon Co. Coudhouse.
11 15 Albany
Caldwell, ID 83605

Dennis Benjamin

3

MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND TO APPOINT
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

MAY & 12007
S T A.T E
0 F
I D A H 0 DATE: 05/16/2007
DEPARTMENT OF! ~ORRECTIONS TIME: 16 :29 : 51
" .
.
TRUST
' FUND'$TATEMENT.
,,,.
. . ..
. . .
.. .. ...... . . ..........
.

OFFSTMT

...

Doc No: 76318

.

.

Name: MCKAY; SHANE".

,,

. ,.

-.
..
,,.
. . . . . -. .,

<

,

SAWC~GHSG PRES FACIL

TIER-C:
CELL-1.
Checking Status: ACTIVE
Savings Status: ACTIVE
'

Transaction Dates: 04/13/2007-05/16/2007

. . .

CHECKING :
Beginning
Balance
95.56

Total
charges
313.91

Total
Payments
274.82

Current
Balance
56.47

SAVINGS :
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
halance
416.06
0.00
1.62
417.68
-- CHECKING TRANSACTIONS ====================================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance

---------- ------------- ------------------ ---------- ---------- -----------

04/16/2007
04/23/2007
04/25/2007
04/25/2007
04/30/2007
04/30/2007
04/30/2007
04/30/2007
05/07/2007
05/07/2007
05/07/2007
05/07/2007
05/07/2007
05/07/2007
05/14/2007

SA0371587-214 099-COMM SPL
8110372359-226 099-COMM SPL
HQ0372543-017 011-RCPT MO/CC
SA0372592-011 070-PHOTO COPY
SA0373102-185 099-COMM SPL
SA0373102-186 099-COMM SPL
HQ0373143-263 335- 3'12007 INTERE
HQ0373144-263 935- 3/2007 INTERE
SA0373998-215 099-COMM SPL
SA0374063-008 218-CACHEICLERK
HQ0374064-001 062-CHILD SUPP
SA0374075-013 218-ASHTON CITY
SA0374079-008 218-DUBOIS CITY
SA0374083-009 218-F&G TEX CREEK
SA0374864-245 099-COMM SPL

- - SAVINGS TRANSACTIONS
-Date

MAIL
33373
INTEREST
INTEREST
APR 'PAY
189530
APR PAY
APR PAY
APR PAY

59.32DB
32.17DB
150.00
O.1ODB
59.82DB
.. 16.96DB
1.62
1.62DB
59.86DB
55.80
25.00DB
0.70
17.10
49.60
59.06DB

.

36.24
4.07
154.07
153.97
94.15
77.19
78 i81'
77.19
17.33
73.13
48.13
48.83
65.93
115.53
56.47

..................................................

Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
---------- ------------- ------------------ ---------- ---------- ----------04/30/2007 HQ0373145-263 035- 3/2007 INTERE INTEREST
1.62
417.68

=

IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/23/2007

=

SAWC/GHSG PRES FACIL

Doc No: 76318
Name: MCKAY, SHANE
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

TIER-C CELL-1

Transaction Dates: 12/01/2006-05/23/2007
Beginning
Balance
205.98

Total
Total
'
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
1754.81
1955.74
5.05
................................
TRANSACTIONS =========
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance

---------- ------------- ------------------ ----------

12/04/2006 HQ0356547-016 030-12/2006 CI IhC
12/04/2006 HQ0356548-008 061-CK INMATE
12/04/2006 HQ0356549-013 062-CHILD SUPP
12/04/2006 HQ0356550-008 078-MET MAIL
12/04/2006 SA0356570-250 099-COMM SPL
12/07/2006 SA0357080-005 218-H&W ST HOSP. S
12/07/2006 SA0357084-002 218-TNF IDAHO FALL
12/11/2006 HQ0357348-012 030-12/2006 CI INC
12/11/2006 HQ0357349-005 061-CK INMATE
12/11/2006 HQ0357351-005 078-MET MAIL
12/11/2006 HQ0357352-011 935-12/2006 CI TRA
12/11/2006 SA0357391-186 099-COMM SPL
12/11/2006 SA0357451-015 070-PHOTO COPY
12/11/2006 SA0357453-020 072-METER MAIL
12/18/2006 9210358219-247 099-COMM SPL
12/18/2006 HQ0358296-012 061-CK INMATE
12/26/2006 SA0359085-248 099-COMM SPL
12/29/2006 HQ0359516-356 335-11/2006 INTERE
12/29/2006 HQ0359517-356 935-11/2006 INTERE
01/02/2007 SA0359590-217 099-COMM SPL
01/03/2007 HQ0359687-012 030- 1/2007 CI INC
01/03/2007 HQ0359688-005 061-CK INMATE
01/03/2007 HQ0359689-010 062-CHILD SUPP
01/03/2007 HQ0359690-005 078-MET MAIL
01/03/2007 HQ0359691-011 935- 1/2007 CI TRA
01/08/2007 SA0360284-239 099-COMM SPL
01/10/2007 HQ0360657-002 011-RCPT MO/CC
01/10/2007 SA0360659-040 072-METER MAIL
01/10/2007 SAO360664-022 070-PHOTO COPY
01/10/2007 HQ0360787-011 030- 1/2007 CI INC
01/10/2007 HQ0360788-005 061-CK INMATE
01/10/2007 HQ0360790-005 078-MET MAIL
01/10/2007 HQ0360791-010 935- 1/2007 CI TRA
01/15/2007 SA0361076-218 099-COMM SPL
01/22/2007 SA0361681-211 099-COMM SPL
01/23/2007 SA0361899-020 072-METER MAIL
01/29/2007 SA0362534-238 099-COMM SPL
01/31/2007 HQ0362996-352 335-12/2006 INTERE
01/31/2007 HQ0362997-352 935-12/2006 INTERE

CI INCOME
FAMILY SUP
189530
FAMILY SUP
NOV PAY
NOV PAY
CI INCOME
FAMILY SUP
FAMILY SUP
CI TRANS
31620
31621
31761
INTEREST
INTEREST
CI INCOME
FAMILY SUP
189530
FAMILY SUP
CI TRANS
MAIL
32247
32245
CI INCOME
FAMILY SUP
FAMILY SUP
CI TRANS
32440
INTEREST
INTEREST

----------

63.66
8.52DB
25.00DB
0.39DB
73.16DB
9.00
4.20
96.26
13.78DB
0.39DB
2.09DB
58.84DB
0.40DB
0.24DB
16.51DB
100.00DB
59.47DB
0.75
0.75DB
10.OODB
176.10
35.16DB
25.00DB
0.39DB
35.55DB
39.37DB
200.00
0.24DB
0.50DB
113.60
17.50DB
0.39DB
15.71DB
53.80DB
51.64DB
0.48DB
20.50DB
0.93
0.93DB

----------269.64
261.12
236.12
235.73
162.57
171.57
175.77
272.03
258.25
257.86
255.77
196.93
196.53
196.29
179.78
79.78
20.31
21.06
20.31
10.31
186.41
151.25
126.25
125.86
90.31
50.94
250.94
250.70
250.20
363.80
346.30
345.91
330.20
276.40
224.76
224.28
203.78
204.71
203.78

=

IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/23/2007 =

Doc No: 76318
Name: MCKAY, SHANE
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

SAWC/GHSG PRES FACIL
TIER-C CELL-1

Transaction Dates: 12/01/2006-05/23/2007
Beginning
Balance
205.98

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
1955.74
1754.81
5.05
................................
TRANSACTIONS ========= .......................
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance

---------- ------------- ------------------ ----------

02/05/2007
02/05/2007
02/05/2007
02/05/2007
02/05/2007
02/07/2007
02/07/2007
02/07/2007
02/07/2007
02/12/2007
02/12/2007
02/14/2007
02/14/2007
02/14/2007
02/14/2007
02/20/2007
02/26/2007
02/28/2007
02/28/2007
03/02/2007
03/02/2007
03/02/2007
03/02/2007
03/02/2007
03/05/2007
03/06/2007
03/12/2007
03/19/2007
03/20/2007
03/20/2007
03/20/2007
03/20/2007
03/20/2007
03/26/2007
03/30/2007
03/30/2007
03/30/2007
04/02/2007
04/03/2007

SA0363333-235 099-COMM SPL
SA0363333-236 099-COMM SPL
SA0363376-009 218- FC PARKS & RE
HQ0363377-002 062-CHILD SUPP
SA0363382-008 218-ASHTON MEMORIA
HQ0363875-008 030- 2/2007 CI INC
HQ0363876-005 061-CK INMATE
HQ0363877-008 062-CHILD SUPP
HQ0363878-005 078-MET MAIL
SA0364357-243 099-COMM SPL
SA0364357-244 099-COMM SPL
HQ0364688-008 030- 2/2007 CI INC
HQ0364689-005 061-CK INMATE
HQ0364691-005 078-MET MAIL
HQ0364692-007 935- 2/2007 CI TRA
SA0365061-239 099-COMM SPL
SA0365776-227 099-COMM SPL
HQ0366184-345 335- 1/2007 INTERE
HQ0366185-345 935- 1/2007 INTERE
HQ0366531-006 030- 3/2007 CI INC
HQ0366532-004 061-CK INMATE
HQ0366533-007 062-CHILD SUPP
HQ0366534-004 078-MET MAIL
HQ0366535-005 935- 3/2007 CI TRA
SA0366701-235 099-COMM SPL
SA0367040-035 071-MED CO-PAY
SA0367599-246 099-COMM SPL
SA0368340-218 099-COMM SPL
SA0368488-007 071-MED CO-PAY
HQ0368494-007 030- 3/2007 CI INC
HQ0368495-004 061-CK INMATE
HQ0368497-004 078-MET MAIL
HQ0368498-006 935- 3/2007 CI TRA
SA0369181-247 099-COMM SPL
SA0369738-024 071-MED CO-PAY
HQ0369823-342 335- 2/2007 INTERE
HQ0369824-342 935- 2/2007 INTERE
SA0369878-213 099-COMM SPL
HQ0370094-007 030- 4/2007 CI INC

JAN PAY
189530
JAN PAY
CI INCOME
FAMILY SUP
189530
FAMILY SUP
CI INCOME
FAMILY SUP
FAMILY SUP
CI TRANS
INTEREST
INTEREST
CI INCOME
FAMILY SUP
189530
FAMILY SUP
CI TRANS
2/26/07
3/13/07
CI INCOME
FAMILY SUP
FAMILY SUP
CI TRANS
03/26/07
INTEREST
INTEREST
CI INCOME

----------

47.92DB
12.91DB
23.85
11.93DB
0.70
53.10
7.11DB
13.07DB
0.39DB
59.86DB
61.48DB
144.94
24.83DB
0.39DB
39.72DB
58.90DB
59.79DB
1.23
1.23DB
178.03
35.33DB
25.00DB
0.39DB
37.31DB
38.67DB
3.00DB
47.18DB
12.78DB
5.00DB
163.00
30.81DB
0.39DB
51.80DB
33.74DB
7.00DB
1.35
1.35DB
37.16DB
175.64

----------155.86
142.95
166.80
154.87
155.57
208.67
201.56
188.49
188.10
128.24
66.76
211.70
186.87
186.48
146.76
87.86
28.07
29.30
28.07
206.10
170.77
145.77
145.38
108.07
69.40
66.40
19.22
6.44
1.44
164.44
133.63
133.24
81.44
47.70
40.70
42.05
40.70
3.54
179.18

= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 05/23/2007 =

Doc No: 76318
Name: MCKAY, S W E
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

SAWC/GHSG PRES FACIL
TIER-C CELL-1

Transaction Dates: 12/01/2006-05/23/2007
Beginning
Balance
205.98

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
5.05
1955.74
1754.81
................................
TRANSACTIONS =========
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
-------------------we---

---------- ------------- ------------------ ----------

04/03/2007 HQ0370095-004 061-CK INMATE
04/03/2007 HQ0370096-008 062-CHILD SUPP
04/03/2007 HQ0370097-004 078-MET MAIL
04/03/2007 HQ0370098-006 935- 4/2007 CI TRA
04/03/2007 SA0370112-001 317-CREDIT MED COP
04/06/2007 SA0370716-007 218-DUBOIS CITY
04/06/2007 SA0370720-007 218-F7W CAMAS CREE
04/09/2007 SAO370817-236 099-COMM SPL
04/12/2007 SA0371346-040 071-MED CO-PAY
04/16/2007 51-10371587-214099-COMM SPL
04/23/2007 SA0372359-226 099-COMM SPL
04/25/2007 HQ0372543-017 011-RCPT MO/CC
04/25/2007 SA0372592-011 070-PHOTO COPY
04/30/2007 SA0373102-185 099-COMM SPL
04/30/2007 SA0373102-186 099-COMM SPL
04/30/2007 HQ0373143-263 335- 3/2007 INTERE
04/30/2007 HQ0373144-263 935- 3/2007 INTERE
05/07/2007 SA0373998-215 099-COMM SPL
05/07/2007 SA0374063-008 218-CACHE/CLERK
05/07/2007 HQ0374064-001 062-CHILD SUPP
05/07/2007 SA0374075-013 218-ASHTON CITY
05/07/2007 8210374079-008 218-DUBOIS CITY
05/07/2007 5,40374083-009 218-F&G TEX CREEK
05/14/2007 SA0374864-245 099-COMM SPL
05/21/2007 5110375764-234 099-COMM SPL

FAMILY SUP
189530
FAMILY SUP
CI TRANS
FIX#369738
MAR PAY
MAR PAY
4/5/07

----------

34.48DB
25.00DB
0.39DB
35.77DB
3.00
34.20
36.45
57.63DB
4.00DB

MAIL
33373
INTEREST
INTEREST
APR PAY
189530
APR PAY
APR PAY
APR PAY

STATE OF IDAHO
Idaho Department of Cwrection
1 hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and
correct copy of an instrument as the same now remains
on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand hereto affixed this

day of

A.D., 20&

----------

144.70
119.70
119.31
83.54
86.54
120.74
157.19
99.56
95.56

DAVID L. YOUNG
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
11 15 Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

1

JUN 0 52007
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
P.SALAS, DEPUTY

Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

SHANE MCKAY,
Defendandpetitioner,
VS.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
PlaintifflRespondent.

1
)

CASE NO. CV0700728

j

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND DENYING
PETITIONER'S CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

)
)
)
)

1\

This case came before the Court on May 21,2007, for hearing on Respondent's Motion
for Summary Disposition under I.C. $19-4896(c) and on Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary
Disposition. Petitioner was represented by Dennis Benjamin, Attorney at Law. Respondent was
represented by GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County. Counsel
for both parties presented oral argument to the Court based upon the prior pleadings, motions and
exhibits submitted herein. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court placed its Findings
of Facts and Conclusions of law on to the record, determining that there were no genuine issues
of material fact, only issues as to how the legal issues were to be resolved.
Based upon the evidencelexhibits, pleadings and arguments, the Court concludes that
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition should be granted, and Petitioner's Cross-Motion
ORDER

Ii:iMOT1ONORD\MCKAY 0RD.wpd

I

should be denied under the standards applicable through Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). The Court finds that Petitioner was benefitted, and not prejudiced, by the jury
instructions given in the jury trial in CR0321789 and that trial counsel and appellate counsel
were not constitutionally deficient in their performance.
THEREFORE, the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition is granted, judgment
herein is granted to Respondent and the Petition herein is ordered DISMISSED. Petitioner's
Cross-Motion is hereby DENIED.

UUN 0 1 2001,

DATED This - day of May, 2007.

//"la,

RENAE J. H O F F
DISTRICT JUDGE

'

"61"

'*

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to
Petition for Post Conviction Relief was mailed to Dennis Benjamin, P.O. Box 2772, Boise, Idaho

5

0h.L

83702, counsel for Petitioner, on or about this -day of-kmimy, 2007.

ORDER
H:IMoTION,ORD'MCKAY ORD.wpd

n

JUN 4 2 2003
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J MEYERS, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE McKAY,

CASE NO. CV 0 7 0 0 7 2 8 ~

)

1
1
1

Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO PROCEED ON
APPEAL IN FORMA
PAUPERIS AND TO
APPOINT STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

)

VS.

1
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
)

Respondent.

THE COURT, having considered Shane McKay's motion to permit him to proceed on
appeal in forma pauperis and to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender to represent him on
his appeal, and good-cause appearing therefore, grants the motion and hereby Orders:
I ) That the costs of proceeding on appeal, including the preparation of the clerk's record

and transcript be prepared at public expense;
2) That the State Appellate Public Defender be and hereby is appointed to represent Mr,
Kay on appeal
DATED THIS

-day of June 2007.
*.

Renae J. Hoff
District Judge

1

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this &ay
of the foregoing document to be
&mailed,

of June 2007, I caused a true and correct copy

by U.S. Mail postage pre-paid

-hand delivered
-faxed
to:

Gearld Wolff
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon Co. Courthouse.
1 1 15 Albany
.Caldwell. ID 83605
Dennis Benjanlin
Nevin, Benjaniin, McKay & Bartletl LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise. ID 83701
Molly Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Ln.
Boise, ID 83703

2

.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE MCKAY,
PetitionerAppellant,
-vsSTATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1
1

1

Case No. CV-07-oop8'C

1
1
1

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

1
1
1
1

I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the
following is being sent as an exhibit:
Presentence Investigation Report (From Case #CR-o3-~178g*C)

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this

(-0

day of August, 2007.

WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho.
the County of canion.
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE MCKAY,
PetitionerAppellant,
-vs-

1
1
1

1
1
j

Case No. CV-o7-00728*C
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerlc of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction
as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of
the Idaho Appellate Rules, including specific documents as requested in the Notice of
Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affied the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this

b

day of August, 2007.

WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
'n and for the County of Canyon.
B~:&&
ew&fl
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
SHANE MCKAY,
PetitionerAppellant,

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Supreme court NO. 34271
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, WILLIAM H. I-IURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record to the attorney of record to each party as follows:
Molly IIusliey, State Appellate Public Defender, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this

b

day of

&"st;

2007.

WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District ofthe State of Idaho,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

